prime13

Iran’s role in the geopolitics of Greater Russia

2012-02-23T18:10:00.003+02:00

Iran’s role in the geopolitics of Greater Russia

When Peter the Great started the Azov Campaigns against the Tartars, in 1695, his aim was to give Russia access to the Black Sea. From that moment, the need of providing the country with an outlet to the warm seas became one of the geopolitical imperatives of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. The end of Moscow’s rule over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia marked a setback to Russian naval ambitions, leaving Russia struggling for regaining lost ground on the continent.

One of the means for the restoration of Russia’s role in Eurasia, facing both NATO’s Eastward expansion and China’s economic rise, could be the creation of a Russian-led Eurasian Union along the lines of the European Union, as proposed by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is seen as the base upon which to push for further integration among post-Soviet economies. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have already expressed interest in the project, while Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seem to be less interested in joining the proposed union.

Despite its economic nature, the geopolitical potentialities of the Eurasian Union may even overcome economic benefits for its members, especially if Western pressures should bring into it one of the most geostrategically important countries in Eurasia: Iran. The Islamic Republic is currently facing international isolation due to its nuclear program, suspected of having military purposes. As confrontation between the United States and Iran escalates, Tehran is finding itself further pushed into an alliance with Russia, with whom the Ayatollahs share a common interest in limiting the political influence of the United States in the post-Soviet space, and concern regarding the possible spread of some form of pan-Turkic ideology in the region.

Tehran’s membership in the Eurasian Union envisaged by Putin would change the geopolitics of Eurasia, fueling Russia’s ambitions on a global scale. Firstly, Iran would expand the geographical scope of the union, bringing its south-western borders to the Persian Gulf. Iranian presence would also strengthen the will of Persian-speaking Tajikistan to join the block, convincing Armenia to do the same. The lack of common borders with any of the countries participating to the Customs Union is actually the reason why Yerevan has rejected any plan to join the Eurasian Union proposed by Putin, despite its strong economic, political and military ties with Moscow. As the largest Shia country in the world, Iran might also allow Russia to increase its presence in other mostly Shia countries such as Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, or countries with powerful Shia or pro-Shia forces such as Lebanon and Syria.

Secondly, Iran’s presence would strengthen Russia’s position in the world hydrocarbons market. With Iranian fields, the Eurasian Union would hold roughly one fifth of the world’s total oil reserves and almost half of the world’s gas reserves. Furthermore, the geopolitical control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s oil transits, would extend Russia’s energy blackmail to Europe on a global scale. It goes without saying that Bandar-Abbas, headquarters of the Iranian Navy, would then become one of the most important bases of the Russian Navy and perhaps the headquarters of a reconstituted Russian Indian Ocean fleet.

The Eurasian Union is undoubtedly the most ambitious project envisaged by the Russian leadership to regain control of the former Soviet space since the Russian Federation exists. Nevertheless, only Iran’s membership may turn this proposed economic block into a truly new geopolitical subject able to successfully confront both the US and China. By bringing an access to the Indian Ocean, Iran would allow Russia for the first time in its history to secure the southern perimeter of Eurasia, and project its geopolitical power over the warms seas. The same war in Afghanistan would have had a different outcome had the Soviet controlled Iran.

THE GREATER RUSSIA OF THE MOSCOW-TEHRAN AXIS

However, Iran’s possible adhesion to the Eurasian Union would largely depend on the role played by Tehran within it. Historically rivals, Iran and Russia would hardly participate to any kind of economic, political or military block clearly led by either Moscow or Tehran, being both nations characterized by strong patriotic feelings. For this reason, the realization of Moscow’s ambitious designs should be first preceded by the achievement of an equal partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, two countries that seems always more destined by geopolitics to face alongside the great challenges of the XXI century.

The Hughes Falcon Missile Family

2012-02-23T17:44:00.001+02:00

The Hughes Falcon Missile Family in PDF <<
(by Sean O’Connor )

Cold War Spreads Over Arctic - Russia to Field First Arctic Brigade in 2015

2012-02-22T11:40:00.012+02:00

Russia to Field First Arctic Brigade in 2015

Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said in July 2011 that two arctic brigades would be established in “Murmansk or Arkhangelsk or some other place.” The first motorized rifle arctic brigade will be deployed in 2015, Russian Ground Forces Chief Col Gen Alexander Postnikov said on Tuesday. President Dmitry Medvedev has called for “extra measures” to protect Russian interests and reinforce its borders in the Arctic. Russia is to deploy a combined-arms force to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic by 2020, including military, border and coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances.

Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the arctic region (PDF)
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF)

Cold War Spreads Over Arctic

Northern Fleet warships guard Arctic resources

Down to recent times the Arctic militarization issue has been absolutely theoretical by climatic reasons. Because of ice pack in the Arctic Ocean and extreme environmental conditions, activities of Russian armed forces in Arctic were either hampered or impossible at all. By the way, with the end of cold war, even those rare troops deployed in the Arctic were reduced or disbanded.

Things have changed in recent years when the ice began extensively melt and large hydrocarbon deposits were discovered on the Arctic shelf. Possible disappearance of ice cover creates conditions for year-round navigation of merchant vessels and warships along the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, seasonal traffic in polar latitudes and shelf hydrocarbon production. Take note, the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia is almost 5,000 km shorter than the way through Suez Canal, and the Northwest Passage is 9,000 km shorter than the course via Panama Canal.

Denmark wants North Pole

The Arctic militarization problem has emerged again. It is exacerbated by the fact that the Arctic Ocean and its shelf have not been demarcated so far, since all regional states have different views on the problem. Russia traditionally stands for sectoral partition, i.e. delimitation of aquatic areas among regional countries on meridians beginning from most points of their coasts converging to the North Pole. Under this scenario, major part of the Arctic Ocean goes over to Russia. By the way, Russia considers the Northern Sea Route its territorial waters. Canada upholds the same position by regarding the Northwest Passage as home waters and also standing for the sectoral variant. The US has an absolutely different look at the issue. The Americans believe that the Arctic countries may only claim for standard 12-mile zones along the coast. Accordingly, the North Pole is considered neutral zone, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are international waterways. Norway and Denmark speak for the Arctic division under median line principle, i.e. borders are lying at equal distances from coastline. In this case, the North Pole goes to Denmark. Border disputes over some particular areas take place between the US and Canada (Alaska and Yukon Territory), Canada and Denmark (over water zone adjacent to the Hans Island 950 sq km in area). In 1977, Norway set a 200-mile preservation economic zone around the Spitsbergen Islands. That became a subject of disputes between Norway and Russia, since in accordance with the sectoral variant the whole eastern part of that 200-mile zone fell into Russian waters. However, last year Moscow and Oslo agreed to halve the disputable area. Moreover, as a matter of fact, Russia has waived sectoral variant only claiming for standard 200-mile economic zone. Another issue is Greenland which gives Denmark an access to the Arctic. Greenland occupies a space of 2.175 mln sq km (the world's largest island) which is 98% of Denmark's area. Population is less than 60,000. Over 160 bln barrels of oil can be found on Greenland's shelf. As a result of referendum held on Nov 25, 2008, 76% of Greenlanders voted for higher degree of autonomy. Now Copenhagen controls only foreign policy and defense; Greenland is entitled to dispose natural resources, has a right to settle juridical and law-enforcement problems, and partially controls foreign policy. All abovementioned countries – except Russia, of course – are NATO members, but in this particular case it is not a big issue as there are serious contradictions among them. It is also noteworthy that notorious Article 5 of the Washington Treaty by no means binds NATO countries to fight for each other. It only demands to hold appropriate consultations.

Sled dog race

Armed forces of Canada, Norway, and Denmark are incapable to perform any sound military action against Russian territory or aquatic area because of generally weak military potentials. Those countries considerably reduced their armies when the cold war was over. For one, according to CFE Treaty information, as of January 1, 1990 Norway had 205 tanks, 146 armored combat vehicles, 531 artillery systems with caliber larger than 100-mm, and 90 combat aircrafts. On January 1, 2011 it had 76 tanks, 218 armored combat vehicles, 67 artillery systems, and 56 combat aircrafts. Denmark on January 1, 1990 operated 419 tanks, 316 armored combat vehicles, 553 artillery systems, and 106 combat aircrafts. Twenty one years later, it had 60 tanks, 299 armored combat vehicles, 56 artillery systems, and 62 combat aircrafts. Canada presently has 186 tanks, 369 armored combat vehicles, 144 artillery systems, and 104 combat aircrafts. Norwegian Navy operates six submarines, six missile boats, six minesweepers, and five frigates. Danish Navy has seven frigates and two support ships (hybrid of a frigate and a landing ship). Canadian Navy – four submarines, three destroyers, twelve frigates and twelve minesweepers. Norway, Denmark, and Canada have neither airborne troops nor marines and lack force projection facilities. Their navies are not capable to attack coastal targets (no ship-based aviation, no cruise missiles) except for shell fire from littoral zone or antiship missile strike upon opponent's ports. It is curious to note that Denmark put up for sale all three navy-operated icebreakers early 2011. One can tell about combat effectiveness of Norwegian and Danish navies judging by their participation in the Libyan War. Each of the mentioned countries dispatched only six F-16 fighters for that operation. Danish aircrafts had spent all air bomb reserves of national air force by the beginning of June. As of Norway, it had withdrawn all six fighters from Italy by August 1 and dropped the operation. Despite quite limited contribution, Norway found the warfare backbreaking. In addition, it must be borne in mind that almost all Canadian land and air bases are situated southward 50th parallel. The "northernmost" is 1-st Mechanized Brigade Group (Edmonton, 53 degrees northern latitude). The only unit based in the north is 1-st Canadian Rangers Patrol Group (Yellowknife, 62 degrees northern latitude). All Danish land forces and aviation units are deployed in Denmark, i.e. on the Jutland Peninsula and adjacent islands. Danish Navy has Greenland command operating one or two warships (on rotation) and two or three fishery security boats. The headquarters is in Gronnedal; its commander is the senior Danish military representative on the island. He controls the Sirius Patrol conducting dogsled reconnaissance along the coast in summer time. The strength of patrol group is 30 men (junior officers and non-commissioned). The US has no forces deployed in European Arctic today (except radars of missile early-warning system in Greenland). Two US Army brigades are based in Alaska (1-stStryker and 4-th Airborne brigade combat teams, 25-th Infantry Division headquartered in Hawaii), and two air wings (3-rd and 354-th) including two F-22 fighter squadrons, two F-16 fighter squadrons, one F-15 fighter squadron, one E-3B AWACS squadron, and one C-17 transport squadron. In addition, Air National Guard's 175-th Wing operating C-130H transport aircraft is stationed in Alaska. There are some other airfields which can accommodate additional combat aircraft. First of all, it is huge civil airport Anchorage used for refueling of long-haul airliners flying from North America to East Asia and back. As of freight-traffic volume, Anchorage is the world's fifth largest airport. Capacities of those airfields allow building up air force deployed in the region several times in 2-4 days (now the strength is over 100 F-22, F-15 and F-16 fighters). Thanks to available airfield network, land grouping can be also rapidly reinforced by airlift of infantry and Stryker brigades to Alaska. To deliver armor units, railway transport (via Canada) and sea lift will be needed. That would take more time. That is Alaska where the largest positioning area of US missile defense system is located. It is equipped with ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles. Twenty six silos had been constructed there, although part of them was flooded by rain showers in June 2006. Totally, it is planned to deploy 30-40 GBI missiles in Alaska. No US Navy warships are based at Alaska. There is only a bunch of US Coast Guard ships and cutters (Alaska lies within USCG District 14). Although US Coast Guard operates four icebreakers, three of them are based in Seattle and the fourth one – on the Great Lakes, so there are no icebreakers permanently stationed at Alaska.

Target is same – Russian nuclear arms

Conversely, all Russian operable forces are concentrated in European Arctic. It is Northern Fleet (including 61-st Marine Regiment), 200-th Infantry Brigade with two S-300P Air Defense Regiments deployed in the Kola Peninsula, and another S-300P Air Defense Regiment near Severodvinsk. There are no more troops to the east. Even with forces deployed in Alaska in peace-time, the US could occupy Chukotka Peninsula hands-down as there are no Russian troops there. And Russia would be incapable to lift armor units there due to considerable distances. The closest to Chukotka infantry brigade is based in Kamchatka, other ones – in Khabarovsk and Primorsky regions. Airlift of those brigades is impossible due to heavy armor vehicles, and sea lift would take long time and, what is more important, would be blocked by US Navy which is considerably stronger than Russian one. Russia may only lift airborne troops and aviation to Chukotka. Curiously, it is easier to redeploy an airborne division from European part to Chukotka then an infantry brigade from Kamchatka. However, that would be quite difficult due to US Air Force's countermeasures.

Russian Northern Fleet's marines on the march

Meanwhile, it is not clear what political and military advantage such operation might give to the US. It provides no apparent benefits while is menacing escalation of conflict even up to all-out nuclear exchange. By the way, the less Russia capable to clear its territory by conventional means, the more likely nuclear scenario is. It can readily be understood that Chukotka is not so important for the US to put in peril existence of own country. The more it is topical for other parts of Russian Arctic coast, because in that case logistics and air defense would be more complicated for the US then. In the contrary, for Russia those tasks would be accordingly simplified. Massive disarming conventional strike of Tomahawk cruise missiles performed by US warships (along with bomber and deck-based aviation) against Russia's strategic nuclear assets seems much more serious threat. Strike of this kind would help to destroy greater part of Russian ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers without global ecological disaster. In such scenario, American nuclear force would keep its potential safe. Even if Russia ventures upon retaliation by survived nuclear forces, it would be repelled with even limited missile defenses. Meanwhile, US warships armed with Standard-SM3 missiles and radars could also participate in countering of Russia's retaliatory strike. To accomplish that mission and smash most of Russia's nuclear assets, American warships should launch Tomahawks from the Arctic. By the way, in this case the ships would be just under flight trajectories of survived Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. This would substantially facilitate America's missile defense because of minimization of crossing point and opportunity to hold head-on but not pursuit firing. The US authorities may suppose that once Russian nuclear force is considerably weakened after disarming strike while American nuclear capability remained safe, Russia would not go in for retaliatory attack at all. Nonetheless, such scenario implies a number of serious risks and restrictions. 1. It must be a single disarming strike, because in case the first strike is either failed or brings minor success, the US would not have another chance. Russia would instantly deliver a full-scale nuclear strike upon America's territory. Thus, maximal nuclear potential of US Navy and US Air Force must be used in the first and the only attack. However, American cruisers and destroyers deployed next to Russia's territorial waters would nullify surprise and makes the operation senseless. If Americans rely only on submarines, cruise missiles would not be enough. 2. Disarming strike by Tomahawks and missile defenses contradict each other, because cruise missiles and Standard surface-to-air missiles are placed in same Mk41 vertical launch systems. Therefore, the more Tomahawks Americans have, the less Standards they may launch, and conversely. 3. Presently, interception of ICBMs by Standard missiles is impossible. It is still unclear whether Americans could improve them properly. 4. Russian ICBN divisions deployed in Siberia remain at standoff range of Tomahawks even if launched from Arctic. Accordingly, realization of such scenario is possible only if all following conditions are implemented at once. 1. Russia's Strategic Nuclear Force, Air Force, Air Defense, Navy and satellite grouping would fully degrade and be reduced minimizing both number of targets for first strike and the possibility of its repelling and conducting of retaliatory attack (upon America's territory and warships). Actually, that degradation stopped two years ago. 2. The US would build up strike potential of its Navy and Air Force, which is extremely unlikely in conditions of current budget constraints. 3. American sea-based cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles would be appreciably improved. There are no guarantees as this needs solution of many serious scientific and technical problems. 4. Russian-American political relations would be so deteriorated that the US Administration would consider the risk of war against Russia acceptable. At present, the opposite trend is seen. It must be emphasized that all four conditions mentioned above must be fulfilled simultaneously. If any of them is not met, the strike would not be performed. So, the probability of such scenario is supposed to be next to zero.

Economic battles on sheld

The competition for hydrocarbon fields on Arctic shelf could be another theoretical scenario for armed conflict. However, it must be understood that oil and gas extraction from the ice-packed ocean has not been implemented so far. Therefore, technological and financial risks are very high making the project profitability unobvious. Due to this, none of oil and gas companies would go for realization of such project until all legal, political, and especially military risks are neutralized. In other words, nobody would produce oil and gas on disputable shelf areas without prior arrangement, because such project would become knowingly loss-making. Thus and so, this scenario of the conflict can be considered absolutely illusory, especially as one takes into account the fact that ownership of only 3% of existent oil and gas deposits is not identified. Naval conflict because of unresolved problems in Arctic navigation – given that the region is free of ice for long period – seems not much more probable. However, abeyance of this issue causing the need of military escort for commercial convoys multiplies freightage costs and nullifies economic benefits from shortened route. The experience of the Yugoslavia War in 1999 (Pristina airport captured by Russian paratroopers) and Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 shows that the United States, not to speak of European countries, are not psychologically ready for even a quite limited conflict with Russia (including conflicts beyond territory of Russia and NATO allies). Undoubtedly, this assumption is applied to naval encounter in the Arctic as well. At another point, if Russia neither develops deposits in its economic zone nor opens the Northern Sea Route (even under own conditions), it would become a 'dog in the manger' and be subjected to economic and political pressing. Sure, nobody will fight against us but make problems by other ways. Another theoretical reason for a conflict in the Arctic may become China's activities. It founded a scientific station on Spitsbergen in 2008, and Chinese icebreaker Xue Long("Snow Dragon") formerly working at the Antarctic has become a constant guest in the Arctic. Main pursuer of China's interests in the region is Norway which even offered to make China a member of the Arctic Council this year (except for five abovementioned countries, now it includes Sweden, Finland, and Iceland). China is in dire need of any natural resources. That is why the Arctic is of considerable interest to Beijing. China's stance is similar to the US one; it also stands for maximal internationalization of the Arctic. However, despite rapid growth of Chinese Navy's potential, it is still incapable to conduct any substantial military operation in the Arctic (primarily, due to lack of bases).

Time to cover Arctic by air defence

Although climatic changes and economic interests of the Arctic countries make regional militarization and armed conflicts theoretically possible, in the foreseeable future probability of any military scenarios looks very low. It must be noted that in the longer prospect strengthening of Russia's defense capability seems one of the key factors for preventing such conflicts both in the Arctic and worldwide. So, Russia should have at least same force in the Arctic as it currently has. Obviously, it would be pointless and cost a pretty penny to build up defense potential too much. As is known, 200-th Infantry Brigade deployed in Pechenga was officially dubbed 'Arctic'. To tell the truth, it is unclear what does it mean. For instance, what it will be equipped with and what will happen to tanks? Well adapted to Arctic conditions, multi-purpose light towing vehicles MTLB and Vityaz are unfortunately outmoded, and it is uncertain what vehicles may substitute them. But it is as clear as day that Arctic-based units must be equipped by helicopters due to specific character of the region. There is no sense to think out a new type for a single military unit. Except for the Kola Peninsula, such brigades must be deployed in Chukotka. Other possible sites of their location are near Arkhangelsk or Severodvinsk, Naryan-Mar or Vorkuta, Salekhard, Norilsk, and Tiksi. Current absolute nakedness of Russian Arctic seems abnormal. As was said above, menace of war is inversely proportional to our defense capability. Perhaps, full disappearance of air defense from the Arctic (eastward Severodvinsk) is much more unacceptable. There must be three or four air defense regiments and two or three air stations. Just to take the issue of disarming strike by Tomahawks off the table. Finally, main ports of the Northern Sea Route must be equipped as naval maintenance centers, although permanent basing of warships there makes little sense. Russia must begin development of hydrocarbon deposits on those parts of Arctic shelf believed to be Russian. In this case, Russia would own those fields de facto, and that would help to start constructive economic cooperation with other countries.

Any conflict on Iran is a direct threat to Russia’s security – Rogozin

2012-02-20T16:34:00.003+02:00

Any conflict on Iran is a direct threat to Russia’s security – Rogozin

The escalating conflict around Iran should be contained by common effort, otherwise the promising Arab Spring will grow into a “scorching Arab Summer,” says Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s former envoy to NATO.“Iran is our close neighbor, just south of the Caucasus. Should anything happen to Iran, should Iran get drawn into any political or military hardships, this will be a direct threat to our national security,” stressed Rogozin.
Dmitry Rogozin, who served as Russia’s special envoy to NATO in 2008-2011, was appointed deputy prime minister by Vladimir Putin in December. On Friday he was bidding farewell to his NATO colleagues in the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels. As for Syria, if NATO persists in interfering in its affairs, a catastrophe will be hard to avoid, said Rogozin, talking to journalists on the premises of the Russian mission to the alliance. “The example of Libya should have cooled everybody down in matters dealing with foreign civil wars,” he said, stressing that this is his personal point of view.

“Syria must be left alone and the sides to the conflict must be assisted in breaking the stand-off and starting negotiations. No one must interfere with Syria. This is dangerous,” added Rogozin. The West’s attempts to improve democracy in the Middle East and North Africa have resulted in Islamists coming to power. It is now up to the West to decide how comfortable they feel with neighbors who determine their politics with Sharia law, says Rogozin. “If we add the escalating tensions around Iran to the situation in Syria and the consequences of the Libyan war, then the upcoming 'scorching' Arab Summer, which is following the Arab Spring, will hardly be to anyone’s taste.”

Russia’s response will make AMD ‘a waste of money’

Despite his recent promotion, Rogozin is still in charge of Russia-NATO discussions on anti-missile defense (AMD) issues. A legal binding that the European and American missile defense systems will not target Russia has not been taken off the table, Rogozin pointed out. “It seems strange that it is Russia who is required to show flexibility. This is not our project. If an architect is building a house, it is up to him to offer a design which would not violate property rights, area design and neighbors’ interests. So it is our US colleagues who should demonstrate miraculous flexibility to ensure that their AMD system does not violate the interests of other countries if it is to be located in Europe.” Rogozin also called on European leaders to stop being “political puppets” in the AMD game, adding that everyone should stand for their own interests, not for some “Atlantic solidarity.” If Moscow’s position is ignored and the range of the US anti-missile defense system covers the European part of Russia, this will be considered a situation requiring defensive action.

“I will certainly ensure Russia will give a corresponding technical response if the AMD system endangers our national interests. This will result in the American AMD being considered a waste of money,” said Rogozin. Russia has everything needed to annihilate any attempt “to strip” its strategic potential, he added. This also means the era of imported weapons is coming to an end. In a farewell gesture, Rogozin said he was considering planting a tree in the alliance’s headquarters. Symbolically enough, this would be a poplar, or “topol” in Russian, which brings up associations with Russia’s modern intercontinental ballistic missiles Topol-M. But NATO replied that planting a tree within the headquarters perimeter “is not possible,” so the tree will have to be planted nearby.

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Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said Western meddling would lead to 'a very big war that will cause suffering not only to countries in the region, but also to states far beyond its boundaries', the New York Times reported. Russia has warned of a 'very big war' causing suffering across the world if Western countries encourage anti-government uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. It came as Iran's foreign minister warned its Arab neighbours not to put themselves in a 'dangerous position' by allying themselves too closely with the U.S. in the escalating row over Tehran's nuclear activity.

Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (left) warned of a 'very big war' if Western countries meddled in the Middle East, as Iran's foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi (right) told Arab neighbours not to cosy up to the U.S.

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The Russian Armed Forces are ready to retaliate to any threat to the country's security, including by using nuclear weapons, Chief of the Russian Army General Staff Gen. Nikolai Makarov said on Wednesday. "If there is a threat to the integrity of the Russian Federation, we are entitled to use nuclear weapons. In that case, we will," Makarov said in an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station. The General Staff sees the nuclear element of the Armed Forces as the basis for strategic stability, he said. "As regards our nuclear forces, we invest the allocated funding up to the last kopek. We are working very seriously to upgrade our nuclear potential," Makarov said.

In particular, the Russian Defense Ministry is buying new-generation nuclear underwater missile carriers, planning to renew and upgrade its strategic bombers, and introducing new missile systems, including Yars, in the service of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, he said.

Concurrently, efforts are being made to develop general-purpose forces, Makarov said. "Unfortunately, we are facing threats from a number of unstable states, where no nuclear weapons but well-trained, strong and mobile Armed Forces are required to resolve any conflict situation," Makarov said.

IRANIAN EXILES MOVE TO NEW IRAQ CAMP !!

2012-02-19T22:20:00.003+02:00

IRANIAN EXILES MOVE TO NEW IRAQ CAMP !!

BAGHDAD (AFP) - Several hundred Iranian exiles arrived at a UN-approved site near Baghdad on Saturday, a first step in a process that aims to see them resettled outside Iraq, where they have been based for decades.The move is part of a December 25 deal between the UN and Iraq, reached after extensive talks, under which around 3,400 Iranians opposed to the regime in Tehran are to move from their long-time base, Camp Ashraf, to a new location called Camp Liberty, with the aim of eventually moving them to other countries."We are arriving at the gate to (Camp) Liberty," Behzad Saffari, the legal adviser for residents of Camp Ashraf, told AFP by telephone around 6:00 am (0300 GMT).

The 397 exiles had departed Camp Ashraf in 18 buses beginning about 1:30 am on Saturday, escorted by Iraqi security forces, Saffari said.However, the arrival at Camp Liberty was not without problems.Saffari said around 2:40 pm that only one bus had actually entered the camp, as residents objected to additional searches of their belongings, which had already been searched in a nearly 12-hour process prior to leaving Camp Ashraf.Eventually, "the residents gave a concession for their stuff to be searched by the dogs, although this is crazy," he said, adding that the process had begun and the buses would be unloaded one by one.

It was not possible to independently verify the account, as journalists were not permitted to go to the camp.Iraq had aimed, by the end of last year, to close Camp Ashraf in Diyala province, which now-executed dictator Saddam Hussein allowed the People's Mujahedeen Organisation of Iran (PMOI) to set up during his 1980-88 war with Iran.But Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said on December 21 that his government had agreed to extend the deadline to April, and signed the deal with the UN on moving the exiles a few days later.UN envoy to Iraq Martin Kobler was present when the exiles arrived at Camp Liberty and welcomed the move, according to a statement from the UN."I commend the residents for their decision to move to Camp Hurriya (Liberty). This is the first step towards a better future outside Iraq. I look forward to their continued cooperation with the Iraqi authorities to complete the relocation without delay," the statement quoted him as saying.Kobler said the UN would monitor the entire relocation process and provide round-the-clock human rights monitoring at Camp Liberty, and called called on potential countries of asylum to confirm their readiness to take in the exiles, whose situation in Iraq has been a long-running sore.The National Council of Resistance of Iran, an umbrella group that includes the PMOI, has complained about the conditions at Camp Liberty, and called for Iraqi police to be withdrawn from the camp before additional exiles move there.

The left-wing PMOI was founded in the 1960s to oppose the shah of Iran, but took up arms against Iran's new clerical rulers after the Islamic revolution in 1979. It said in 2001 that it had renounced violence.The US State Department has blacklisted it as a terrorist organisation since 1997, and says members of the group carried out a large number of attacks over several decades against Iranian targets, and also against Americans.The PMOI strongly opposes the terrorist designation and is seeking to have it lifted in the United States, as it has been in Europe.In May 2005, Human Rights Watch cited former PMOI members as having "reported abuses ranging from detention and persecution of ordinary members wishing to leave the organisation, to lengthy solitary confinements, severe beatings and torture of dissident members."Camp Ashraf was disarmed following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and came under US military protection, but American forces handed over security responsibilities to the Baghdad authorities in January 2009.Iraqi security forces raided Camp Ashraf in July 2009, leading to clashes in which 11 residents were said to have been killed and several hundred wounded.Camp Ashraf has been back in the spotlight since a controversial April 2011 raid by Iraqi security forces left 36 people dead and scores injured.

Iranian Ships Docks in Syria Port - Iran began construction of destroyer Jamaran 2

2012-02-19T21:55:00.002+02:00

Iranian Ships Docks in Syria Port

supply vessel Kharg

Iranian warships have docked in the Syrian port of Tartus, Iranian media reported on Sunday. The Mehr news agency said the deployment caused “extreme worry for zionist forces,” al Jazeera television reported. Iranian officials usually refer to Israel as the “Zionist regime.

Iran's English-language television station Press TV said two Iranian ships arrived at the port, which is home to Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base, on February 17. It also cited Hossein Ebrahimi, deputy chairman of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, as saying that the presence of Iran’s naval forces in Syrian waters was a clear warning to the United States to refrain from military intervention in Syria.

Iran's navy commander, Admiral Habibollah Sayari, announced on Saturday that the country's "strategic navy" passed through the Suez Canal for the second time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Sayari did not specify how many vessels were being deployed. Violence in Syria has continued over the weekend. On Saturday, troops fired mourners at a funeral in Damascus, killing at least one person. Earlier on Sunday, Egypt recalled its ambassador to Syria and Damascus was reported to have responded in kind. The government says around 2,000 members of its security forces have been killed combating “armed gangs and terrorists.”
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Iran began construction of destroyer Jamaran 2, reports news agency IRINN referring to Iranian Navy Commander ADM Habibollah Sayyari.

He added that construction of the destroyer Jamaran 2 was conducted by own efforts under direction of Iranian experts. Sayyari pointed out that the new destroyer would constitute a development ofJamaran destroyer built in Feb 2010. Destroyer Jamaran is Iran's domestically built ship. She carried out first overseas cruise on Dec 18, 2011 after participation in the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden. The 1,420-ton destroyer Jamaran based in Iranian Navy's 16-th Flotilla is equipped with advanced radioelectronics, a heliport, and has max speed up to 30 knots. The ship is armed with up-to-date antiaircraft, antiship, and antisubmarine systems, as well as torpedo tubes and gun mounts. Iranian Navy's officials earlier said construction of five similar and even more advanced ships was in progress.

ranian Navy’s officials earlier said construction of five similar and even more advanced ships was in progress.

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Battle off the coast of Abkhazia

2012-02-17T16:58:00.007+02:00

Battle off the coast of Abkhazia ..

The Battle off the coast of Abkhazia was a naval engagement between vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and patrol boats of the Coast Guard of Georgia during the 2008 South Ossetia War. According to a purported eyewitness account posted in the Ukrainian Communications Portal (UPK.com), the skirmish took place, during a night-time landing of Russian troops at Ochamchira, where the troops were to meet up with their vehicles and supplies, arriving from Russia to Abkhazia by railroad

The Engagement
The identity of the allegedly sunk Georgian ship was initially reported as the missile boat Tbilisi. However, that ship is now documented on film as having been destroyed in the port of Poti along with the other missile boat of the Georgian Navy, the Dioskuria. The remaining units, all but one also destroyed in Poti, are small patrol ships of either the Georgian Navy or its Coast Guard. It is the latter's fastest unit (35 knots), P-21 Giorgi Toreli, that is identified now by consensus as the vessel sunk at the Battle off the coast of Abkhazia, with the probable total loss of its crew.
The Tbilisi is a Matka class missile boat while the P-21 Giorgi Toreli is a Stenka class patrol boat. Their radar signature and other electronic activity could conceivably have led to confusion, provided no missiles were fired by the Georgian vessel, as neither ship has such weaponry.

missile boat Mirazh .. shown in the video below
Russian Navy operations

The Russian Navy dispatched two task forces from Sevastopol, one allegedly to impose a naval blockade on Georgia^{[citation needed]}, while the other, bearing amphibious troops and assisted by guided missile cruiser Moskva and smaller missile-warfare capable ships allegedly advanced to the coast of Abkhazia^{[citation needed]}, to the small port of Ochamchira. The possibly 400 troops on board were to strike deep from Ochamchira to points north (Kodori Gorge), southeast Senaki and south Poti^{[citation needed]}.

According to Chinese reporting citing unnamed Russian sources the blockading units were assigned the task to not allow arms and military hardware supplies to reach Georgia by sea.^[5]

Unconfirmed Georgian information reported the Russian task forces allegedly moving toward Georgia comprised the following units with the exact allocation to each one task force yet undetermined:^[6]

Kashin class destroyer (Upgraded) Smetlivy
Alligator class landing ship Saratov.
Ropucha class landing ships Caesar Kunikov and Yamal.
Albatros-class Anti-Submarine Corvettes Kasimov, Povorino and Suzdalets.
Nanuchka class corvette Mirazh.
Bora class guided missile hovercraft Samum
Moma Class Surveillance ship Ekvator.
Natya Class Minesweepers Zhukov and Turbinist.
Small Landing Ship Koida
Sorum Class Fleet Tug MB-31.

The task force was co-ordinated and deployed from Sevastopol in Ukraine, home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.^[7]

While the Georgian authorities are silent on any naval battle, they have claimed detailed information as to the damages inflicted on Georgia by the Black Sea Fleet, besides the declared blockade mission. The Russian task force, according to the Georgian Foreign Ministry statement, landed 4,000 troops and met up with their armor in Ochamchira. It then went on to support an attack against Georgian troops deployed at Kodori Gorge and struck deep into Georgia proper, reaching the port of Poti.

The Georgian source goes on to allege that a missile attack was launched against an inland target in "Kodori" by the Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva.^[4]^[8]

[edit]The engagement

According to Black Sea Fleet officials, Georgian Navy ships consisting of two missile boats and two auxiliary craft breached the "security zone" declared around the Russian Navy ships off Abkhazia. The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that, after two sorties by the Georgians against the Russian fleet, the Russian units retaliated with naval anti-ship missiles and gunfire, sinking one of the attacking ships and forcing the remaining three Georgian warships to withdraw towards the port of Poti. While the Georgian sources remain silent about the engagement, Abkhazian officials confirmed that some battle took place off their coast.

It was to transpire one day later than claimed by other sources and was confirmed by official Russian sources as having taken place on 10 August 2008, and that a Georgian warship was struck and sunk in 300 m of water by two P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 'Siren') missiles, fired by theguided missile corvette MRK Mirazh. Furthermore, the Russians were on record as believing that a second ship was also damaged, but by naval gunfire. The latter claim has since been retracted. More problematically, Russia reported, as did the Russian witness sailor, that the vessel sunk in action was the missile boat Tbilisi, but this proved to be false. It is now believed that the vessel destroyed was the fast P-21 patrol ship Giorgi Toreli, a Coast Guard Border Patrol vessel, armed with two 30mm automatic cannons.

Russians sources claim that P-21 "disappeared from the surface" within 90 seconds in 300 m of water.
[edit]Aftermath

Russian land forces that landed in Ochamchira took control of the port of Poti on 12 August 2008. According to the Georgian government all the naval vessels there, most of which were Coast Guard Border Police patrol vessels, were destroyed at the pier by the demolition teams or hauled off and sunk in shallow water just outside the port entry, as was the case with the missile boat Dioskuria. The crews were permitted to leave beforehand, unharmed.[4] The captain of the corvette Mirazh, Ivan Dubik, was received in Moscow by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who awarded him a military medal, along with another members of the Russian armed forces

New Russian Tank to Appear in 2013 ..(based on object 195?)

2012-02-17T14:23:00.006+02:00

New Russian Tank to Appear in 2013

Russia will complete the first prototype of the new Armata main battle tank by 2013 and begin production and deliveries to the Russian Armed Forces in 2015, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and the CEO of tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod Oleg Sienko told Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the Lenta.ru news portal reported. Uralvagonzavod and the military are testing the main components of the new tank. No other details were reported. “The Russian armed forces will have a new main tank with fundamentally new characteristics, fully automated loading and separate crew compartment by 2015,” Lieutenant-General Yuri Kovalenko, former First Deputy Head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Automotive Armor Directorate said last April. Kovalenko said work from other projects, including Object 195 and Black Eagle, will be incorporated in Armata's design.

* Crew protection on the tank will be emphasized to a far greater degree than ever before in Russian tank designs. The level of crew protection should ensure its survival when the tank is hit by any anti-tank munitions from any aspect or angle, thanks to the crew placement in a unitary armored pod inside the hull.

* A unique drivetrain suspension system is being tested on this tank that to a certain extent extinguishes the hull vibrations and stabilizes its position.

* The tank still remains in Class 50 (i.e. it weighs 50 tons) and it shall have an even smaller silhouette than the modern Russian MBTs.

* The gun will be a 152mm smoothbore tank gun/ATGM launcher. The development of this system started as far back as end of the fifties for the heavy tanks (originally a rifled gun, probably M-69). The project was revived in the eighties and the gun was significantly redesigned. Even with ordinary powders a very high initial velocity of an APFSDS projectile is achieved.

* This gun shall be located in an unmanned gun pod on top of the hull with no crew access to it. This is likely to increase survivability and lower the silhouette even further.

* The fire control system will be multi-channel (optical + thermal + IR + laser + radar).

* The carousel autoloader goes away.

* According to plans the crew will consist of a 3 man combat structure and one mechanic (not unlike the air force crew structure), who will be responsible for vehicle maintenance and will reside in a battalion service and repair company.

----------------------------------------

В апреле замминистра обороны Владимир Поповкин заявил, что военные прекращают финансирование разработки новейшего танка, известного под названием Т-95, и не возражают против его рассекречивания и показа публике, которая хочет увидеть его не меньше, чем хотела увидеть истребитель пятого поколения, показанный «Сухим» в январе. Когда это будет возможно?
— Я сам хотел бы, чтобы она была показана, но мы пока не можем это сделать, не получив все необходимые разрешения. Могу только сказать, что никто ничего подобного не сделал. А что касается судьбы этой машины и других новых машин — надеюсь, ясность будет внесена в новой госпрограмме вооружений.
— То есть в следующем году машина не будет рассекречена?
— Не могу пока ничего об этом сказать.
— Можно ли на базе Т-95 создать упрощенную машину? Часто говорят, что машина очень сложна и промышленность ее не осилит.
— Мы работаем над созданием единой боевой платформы, она находится в интенсивной разработке, могу сказать, что там достигнуто новое качество, мы разрабатываем ее, естественно, по желанию военных.
- И там учитывается опыт Т-95?
— Безусловно.
— А когда будет показана эта новая платформа, разрабатываемая, видимо, по ОКР «Армата»: до 2015 г. или позже?
— Безусловно, мы не будем ждать 2015 г., это слишком поздно. Мы работаем и над ней, и над другими видами платформ. Разрабатываем и новые двигатели — мощностью 1500 л. с. и 1800 л. с., они проходят испытания, самое главное, чтобы с их производством не было проблем у комплектаторов. Мы работаем и над электроприводом, это обеспечивает большую экономию топлива и плавность хода. И вообще большие преимущества перед традиционным двигателем.
— На новой унифицированной платформе будет электропривод?
— Да, вполне вероятно.

kuban cossacks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuban_Cossacks

New generation nuclear facility launched in Iran

2012-02-16T16:38:00.001+02:00

New generation nuclear facility launched in Iran

An image grab taken from a broadcast on February 15, 2012 on the state-run Press TV shows Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inside Tehran's research reactor. Ahmadinejad led a ceremony inserting Iran's first domestically produced, 20-percent enriched nuclear fuel into Tehran's research reactor

A defiant Iran and a pricklyUS-Israel alliance moved further down the slippery slope to a shooting match on Wednesday as Washington sent a second aircraft carrier into the Strait of Hormuz even as Tehran announced key nuclear technology advances and threatened cuts in oil supplies to six EU nations.

In acts of mutual provocation, the nuclear-powered USS Abraham Lincoln sailed within sniffing distance of Iran, going through the Straits of Hormuz,that is only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, inviting an Iranian patrol boat to tail it within two miles.

Iran also responded by upping the nuclear ante, defiantly showcasing advances in nuclear technology in the face of US-Israel led sanctions regime aimed at curtailing its possible development of nuclear weapons.

Iran had earlier threatened to shut down the Straits of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes (not to speak of US supplies to the Af-Pak theatre), if it was attacked.

Teheran was reported to have cut oil supplies to six European nations, including the PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) which are in an economic crisis, in an effort to get ahead of European sanctions that is expected to kick in soon.

All these moves followed violent and mostly covert confrontation between the US-Israel alliance and Iran. There have been mysterious assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists which Teheran thinks is the handiwork of the US-Israel alliance.

Now, Israeli diplomats and assets have been attacked in three capitals across the world, including New Delhi, which Israel believes is the handiwork of Iranian agents.

New Delhi is stuck between Iran, vital to India's energy security, and a hard place (US and Israel) that is key to its military and technological well-being. The duo is putting tremendous pressure on New Delhi to forsake Iranian oil.

But like China, India remains unmoved, causing much handwringing in Washington.

In fact, even loyal US allies like Japan and South Korea are reluctant to follow the US-Israel diktat, causing some pundits to pronounce the sanctions a failure. Each of the four countries imports about 10% of their oil supplies from Iran.

In US, polls show there is little appetite for another war even though a section of the neoconservative establishment is itching for a shootout to punish Iran.

Having shut down US military operations in Iraq, president Obama is also winding down fromAfghanistan ahead of the November elections, and some pundits seen the Iranians pushing the envelope knowing the US president's political constraints. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-nuclear-warship-bears-down-on-defiant-Iran/articleshow/11905824.cms

Elite Syrian units take by storm rebel-seized area in Damascus

2012-02-15T12:29:00.000+02:00

Elite Syrian units take by storm rebel-seized area in Damascus

Elite Syrian Army units, reinforced by infantry combat vehicles, are taking by storm the Barza area, in downtown Damascus, where rebels and terrorists of the so-called Free Syrian Army have been active. Mechanized division units and the Republican Guards have set up checkpoints on the main streets of the area. Heavy fighting has also engulfed other parts of Syria. According to the SANA news agency, a large gang was wiped out in the environs of the city of Aleppo.In Homs, rebels were blocked in several residential quarters. They are firing mortars and blowing up dwelling houses. Earlier today, the rebels exploded the city oil pipeline.

Comdr. of Syria's al-Farouq rebels Abdul Razzaq Talas killed

2012-02-09T15:42:00.012+02:00

<< Comdr. of Syria's al-Farouq rebels killed

Syrian rebel group leader Abdul Razzaq Talas, whose al-Farouq group is accused of participation in terror attacks in the country, has been killed.

A major commander of Syria’s al-Farouq militant group has been killed by government forces in the western city of Homs as fighting between the two sides intensifies there.Abdul Razzaq Talas, along with an assistant of his, were killed on Thursday in heavy clashes with the Syrian armed forces. Once a high-ranking officer, Talas defected from the Syrian army late last year and his so-called al-Farouq militant group is blamed for terrorist attacks against civilians and security and military forces in Syria. In the last days, violence has been raging in Homs, where Syrian media say over 100 troops have been killed in fighting with armed militants. The army has, however, managed to take control of several districts and towns in the troubled city.

Meanwhile on Thursday, seven troops were killed and several others injured near the southern town of Daraa when two military buses were ambushed by armed militants. Damascus says at least 2,000 security forces personnel are among those killed since the violence erupted in the country in March 2011.

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Also (σχετικό) >>

An intelligence report has revealed that British and Qatari troops are leading armed terror gangs in the Syrian city of Homs in their bloody battle against civilians and the Syrian army forces.
http://truthsyria.wordpress.com/2012/01/19/the-so-called-al-farouk-battalion-is-the-terrorist-group-behind-the-abduction-of-the-iranian-engineers/

CNN publisity support to the rebels ...

The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space?

2012-02-08T16:46:00.000+02:00

The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space?

Οι Σύριοι υποδέχονται με ενθουσιασμό τον LAVROF

2012-02-07T17:23:00.001+02:00

Οι Σύριοι υποδέχονται με ενθουσιασμό τον LAVROF

Syrian forces resumed their intense bombardment of the restive central city of Homs on Tuesday as Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov held talks in Damascus with Bashar al-Assad.

Speaking after meeting the president, Mr Lavrov said Mr Assad would soon set a date for a referendum on a new constitution. Russia’s Itar-Tass news agency quoted Mr Lavrov as saying: "President Assad informed (me) that he will meet in the coming days with the commission that prepared a draft of the new constitution."

Mr Lavrov confirmed to reporters he would be carrying a message to Mr Assad from Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, but declined to reveal its contents. He was accompanied by Russia’s foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov. “Every leader of every country must be aware of his share of responsibility. You are aware of yours,” state-run RIA quoted Mr Lavrov as saying at the talks in Damascus.

Russia, which has a military base in Syria and sells weapons to the government, has been pressing for an acceleration of political reforms in Damascus. But Syrian opposition activists say no measure of reform can make the Assad regime regain credibility.

Syrian opposition agrees to Russian mediation

2012-02-07T17:04:00.000+02:00

The opposition Syrian National Council does not object to Russia coordinating the talks with the Syrian government.

"The Syrian opposition needs all the help there is. Considering the good relations between the Russian and Syrian nations, Russia has a good chance of playing this part," George Sabra, a senior member of the council, told Interfax news agency on Tuesday.

His remarks come in the wake of talks between the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Moscow has offered its assistance to bridge a diplomatic gap between the ruling regime and opposition groups.

“We think Russia should provide a roadmap for such a dialogue. Then all the opposition groups can take corresponding steps. But no one will engage in a dialogue just for the dialogue’s sake,” added George Sabra.

But the council representative believes the veto Moscow used against the UN resolution on Syria would hamper its mediating role.

The Syrian National Council, based in Istanbul, positions itself as a government in exile.

The Council runs another oppositional group, the Free Syrian Army, a paramilitary comprised of Syrian Armed Forces defectors. The Army might win recognition as the only legitimate representative of the Syrian people in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are set to pass the act, reports The Saudi Gazette.

20 million yr old Antarctic lake 'drilled'

2012-02-07T16:52:00.001+02:00

After 30 years spent drilling through a four-kilometer-thick ice crust, researchers have finally broken through to a unique subglacial lake. Scientists are set to reveal its 20-million-year-old secrets, and imitate a quest to discover ET life.

Τhe main inspiration for the project – the Russian scientist who posited the lake’s existence – died just six months before the moment of contact with the lake’s surface.

Now, the whole world is looking to Lake Vostok for crucial data which might help to predict climate change. The Vostok project breathes an air of mystery and operates at the frontiers of human knowledge. The lake is one of the major discoveries in modern geography; drilling operations at such depths are unprecedented; never before has a geological project required such subtle technologies. “Yesterday [on Sunday] our scientists at the Vostok polar station in the Antarctic completed drilling at depths of 3,768 meters and reached the surface of the subglacial lake,” RIA Novosti reported, quoting an unnamed Russian scientist.

Meanwhile, Itar-Tass news agency says the scientists still have a few meters to go.

http://rt.com/news/antarctic-million-secrets-lake-583/

Lake Vostok is a unique closed ecosystem hidden under some four kilometers of ice. Its water has been isolated from the atmosphere – and therefore from any contact with the outside world – since before man existed. The key question for scientists is, could the lake harbour life?

However in 1998, drilling had to be halted just 130 meters from the lake’s surface after the alarm was raised over concerns that the ancient and unblemished waters risked being polluted if special precautions were not taken.

The relevant technology was developed in 2003 in St. Petersburg. Work resumed in 2005 after tests.

After the 24-hour-a-day drilling work is over, scientists are to take samples of lake water which penetrates through the crack. Specialists at the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute predict they will find “the only giant super-clean water system on the planet.” The pristine water will be “twice cleaner than double-distilled water,” they believe.

The Vostok Antarctic research station is no Bali resort. Its temperatures average around –66 degrees Centigrade. Earth’s the lowest ever temperature was recorded there on July 21, 1983, when it hit –89.2 C.

T-50 vs F-22A. The technology of Quantum Well Imaging Photodetectors (QWIP) will upset the balance

2012-02-01T14:11:00.005+02:00

Consider a QWIP technology “OLS-50M” installed in the PAK-FA. Such a device could be design-optimised for simultaneous detection and tracking of aircraft exhausts, jet-plumes and missile flares to ranges of 70 nm and beyond

Suppose the Russians don’t quite master stealth to the degree of the F-22A, but manage a RCS of 0.01 square metres from all aspects. The F-22A’s APG-77 will detect the PAK-FA at ~40 nm and the F-35’s APG-81 at ~30 nm. Passive electronic surveillance might increase detection ranges, but this still makes long-range missile shots problematic, as tracking depends upon the opponent emitting, which smart opponents will try not to do.

The PAK-FA’s radar can be expected to be an improvement on the IRBIS-E so at front-on aspects might detect the F-22A at ~15 nautical miles and the F-35 at ~28 nautical miles; and from side and rear aspects, the F-22A at ~43 nautical miles and the F-35 at ~51 nautical miles.

Infrared sensors are the next growth area in air combat. Every air combat jet has unavoidable infrared signatures – converting kerosene into thrust at prodigious rates does that. The existing OLS-35, developed for the Su-35BM, is credited with the ability to detect a ‘fighter type’ target head on from 27 nautical miles, and from behind at around 50 nautical miles, through a 90° sector. It uses conventional detector technology, and provides similar performance to the Eurofighter Typhoon PIRATE infrared sensor.

It is likely the PAK-FA will have infrared signature management as is found on the designs of the YF-23A, B-2A and the F-22A, but not on the F-35

The emerging technology of Quantum Well Imaging Photodetectors (QWIP) is set to cause an upset in this market sector.

Advances in QWIP technology single chip imagers will see a new generation of infrared sensors deploy over the next decade. Not limited in infrared colour sensitivity like legacy bandgap imagers, QWIP imagers offer the potential to detect cooler targets are greater distances, and provide the high resolution required for standoff identification of targets. Above 10.2 micron band 10242 pixel longwave image produced by a US Army Research Lab / L-3 Cincinnati corrugated QWIP [no image enhancement applied], depicted below. QWIP technology is now available in the US, EU and Russia. QWIP based imaging Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) detectors can be “tuned” by design for sensitivity in a particular infrared band, using a fundamentally different detection technique to conventional “band gap” detectors where the material determines the colour sensitivity of the detector. QWIPs capable of simultaneously imaging in two, three or four infrared bands have also been manufactured and marketed. QWIP technology, therefore, opens up the potential for even greater detection ranges against targets cooler than what current production infrared sensors can track, and provide for much better infrared background rejection.

Consider a QWIP technology “OLS-50M” installed in the PAK-FA. Such a device could be design-optimised for simultaneous detection and tracking of aircraft exhausts, jet-plumes and missile flares to ranges of 70 nm and beyond – the limiting factors are the size of the optics, cooling system and detector area. Russia has decades of experience in the integration of infrared sensors into its weapons systems, and QWIPs could well become the primary sensor and radar the secondary. This means that the F-22A AN/ALR-94 will be denied signals to detect and track the PAK-FA.

The ‘shooting match’ shifts from radar-centric to ‘infrared centric’. The problem here is that the PAK-FA will have it, the F-22A does not, and the ability of the F-35 EOTS and DAS to make long range aircraft detections and guide weapons is at best ‘unproven’. The F-35 systems have not been designed to be highly sensitive at the task of searching and tracking distant aircraft at those infrared colours where aircraft and their jet engines emit most of their infrared energy. An understanding of the physics, or for the ever-hopeful, a simple Developmental Test and Evaluation exercise will demonstrate this. With the Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) radar detections being reduced to distances below 60 nautical miles and infrared sensor detection ranges growing beyond 50 nautical miles, a new generation of missiles will be required to dominate the battlespace.

Russian missile companies have shown much more flexibility and adaptability in the design of missiles, so the PAK-FA could have a new-generation of shorter range, but higher agility missiles – a fusion of the ideas in the R-74 and R-77M, with a diverse mix of seeker heads. These missiles will likely be cued by the IRST sensor, be equipped with inertial midcourse guidance and, probably, mid-course guidance update capability transmitted either by radio, or possibly infra-red laser or millimetric wave links. Expect the PAK-FA to have vectored thrust and high levels of agility like the Flankers it is to either replace or complement. Long missile range requires large rocket or ram-jet motors and these heavy weapons lack the agility to pull high terminal ‘G’, and may be ‘ducked’ by the PAK-FA as easily as by the Su-35-1.

The PAK-FA will use a new super-cruising engine, based on technology from the Al-41F series, so its tactic might be to maintain combat speeds of about Mach 1.5 and use a more compact version of the ramjet RVV-AE-PD. A supersonic launch enables a ramjet to light without a powerful booster – thereby denying an opponent the detection of the usual missile launch flare.

Fights between the F-22A and the PAK-FA will be close, high, fast and lethal. The F-22A may get ‘first look’ with the APG-77, the Advanced Infra Red Search and Track (AIRST) sensor having been deleted to save money, but the PAK-FA may get ‘first look’ using its advanced infrared sensor. Then, the engagement becomes a supersonic equivalent of the Battle of Britain or air combat over North Korea. The outcome will be difficult to predict as it will depend a lot on the combat skills of the pilots and the capabilities of the missiles for end-game kills. There is no guarantee that the F-22 will prevail every time.

The fate of the F-35 Lightning II would be far worse in an air combat environment challenged by the PAK-FA. If the Mach 1.5 PAK-FA is using its infrared sensor as the primary sensor and observes radio frequency emission control (EMCON), then the first detection by the F-35’s APG-81 radar could be at ~20 nautical miles or less with a missile launched by the PAK-FA’s infrared sensors already inbound from 60 to 70 nautical miles away. The PAK-FA could easily break to a direction outside the F-35’s AIM-120 engagement zone.

The sustained turning performance of the F-35A Lightning II was recently disclosed as 4.95 G at Mach 0.8 and 15,000 ft. A 1969 F-4E Phantom II could sustain 5.5 Gs at 0.8 Mach with 40 percent internal fuel at 20,000 feet. The F-35 is also much slower than the 1960s F-4E or F-105D. So the F-35A’s aerodynamic performance is ‘retrograde’ when compared with 1960s legacy fighters. The consequence of such inferior JSF performance is that its DAS might detect an incoming missile, but the aircraft lacks the turn-rate to out-fly it. As the F-35 also lacks the performance to engage or escape, repeated ‘freebie’ shots from the PAK-FA could inflict high losses. Expect the exchange rate to be of the order of 4:1 in favour of the PAK-FA, possibly much higher.

Russian aerospace companies have demonstrated an ability to outpace US aerospace manufacturers in terms of delivery of an operational capability and also the diversity of the capabilities of their weapons systems. The cumbersome US acquisition system, and marketing rather than technology driven aerospace industry, put the US at a distinct competitive disadvantage in rapidly adapting to an evolving threat environment. The most dangerous situation the US could face, is where the high and upwardly spiralling development and production costs of the JSF ‘cuckoo’ the available resources, which are needed to develop the advanced capabilities necessary to counter the new Russian PAK-FA, and the generation of new weapons which the PAK-FA will inevitably be armed with.

Complacency is not an option. Having ruled the roost for the decade out to 2015, the F-22A may be knocked off its perch by a newcomer, unless the US invests in new sensors, especially, and advanced technology Infra-Red Search and Track, stealth improvements and a new generation of missiles for the F-22 – assuming it even builds more than the token number of F-22s currently planned. The F-35 has already been neutralised and negated by the Su-35-1/35BM and will be substantively overmatched by the PAK-FA. (partially copied from http://spie.org/x27591.xml?pf=true&highlight=x2410&ArticleID=x27591 )

Fotos of the day

2012-01-31T22:40:00.005+02:00

SSN Nerpa Handed Over to India

2012-01-30T12:24:00.000+02:00

SSN Nerpa Handed Over to India

Project 971U Schuka-Bnuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) K-152Nerpa has been leased to Indian Navy; the handing-over ceremony was held on Jan 23 atZvezda Shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen (Primorsky Krai), an undisclosed informed source told Interfax.

The ceremony was attended by representatives of Rosoboronexport, United Shipbuilding Corporation, Pacific Fleet (PF) command, and India's diplomatic mission; it started at 10.30 am, local time (3.30 am, Moscow time). At request of the Indian party, press was not allowed to participate in the ceremony, said the interviewee.

The submarine obtained the name of INS Chakra and will be controlled by Indian crew during the next 10 years without participation of Russian experts. The contract costs over $900 mln, reminds ITAR-TASS.

The acceptance certificate was signed on Dec 30, 2011 in Russian Navy Main HQ. Nerpa was supposed to join Indian Navy in 2008, but an accident happened to the sub during sea trials in Nov 2008; 20 men died then and leasing date was postponed. Later on, it was changed many times due to non-availability of onboard combat systems, reminds Interfax.

In Aug 2010, some media agencies reported that Nerpa had already departed for India; however, that information was refuted by Amur Shipyard and Pacific Fleet HQ.

Nerpa will be the only nuclear-powered submarine in Indian Navy and be stationed at the Visakhapatnam naval base. Supposedly, the sub would be used as training platform for the crew of Indian-made nuclear submarine INSArihant.

The siege of Leningrad... lifted 27 January 1944

2012-01-27T14:31:00.004+02:00

Siege of Leningrad
The siege continued until 27 January 1944

Fotos

The Siege of Leningrad, also known as the Leningrad Blockade (Russian:блокада Ленинграда, transliteration: blokada Leningrada) was a prolonged military operation resulting from the failure of the German Army Group North to capture Leningrad, now known as Saint Petersburg, in the Eastern Front theatre of World War II. It started on 8 September 1941, when the last land connection to the city was severed. Although the Soviets managed to open a narrow land corridor to the city on 18 January 1943, lifting of the siege took place on 27 January 1944, 872 days after it began. It was one of the longest and most destructive sieges in history and one of the most costly in terms of casualties.....

The siege continued until 27 January 1944, when the Soviet Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Offensive expelled German forces from the southern outskirts of the city. This was a combined effort by the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, along with the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts. The Baltic Fleet provided 30% of aviation power for the final strike against the Wehrmacht. In the summer of 1944, the Finnish Defence Forces were pushed back to the other side of the Bay of Vyborg and the Vuoksi River.

The Situation in Transdniestria Is Like a Carefully Orchestrated Campaign

2012-01-25T17:02:00.001+02:00

The Situation in Transdniestria Is Like a Carefully Orchestrated Campaign

Another protest action organized by the Moldovan side took place at the peacekeeping post No. 9 on the bridge over the Dniester River. A group of Moldovan citizens attacked the peacekeeping post, having pulled out the road signs installed at the post and broken the bar.

Notwithstanding that chairman of the Dubossary district of Moldova, Gregory Polichinsky, who spearheaded the campaign, called on the audience to a peaceful protest, the protesters made a brawl with each other, quarreled because some protesters from Kishinev called to ?push the matter through?. The fight was stopped through the intervention of Moldovan policemen in place.

It is a reminder that the situation in Transdniestria worsened after the incident on January 1, 2012, when at the post of Joint Peacekeeping Forces a Russian peacekeeper mortally wounded a resident of the Moldovan village of Parata, who had repeatedly tried to cross the peacekeeping post driving a car which did not belong to him, in a drunken state and without driving licence.

Sergey Panteleyev, Director of the Russian Emigre Research Institute in an interview with the Peacekeeper.Ru portal commented on provocative nature of actions and statements by the Moldovan side, the European Union?s statements demanding the revision of the peacekeeping operations format that followed the incident at the peacekeeping post.

- Sergey Yuryevich, how can the statements by the Moldovan Foreign Ministry and representatives of the EU demanding to change the format of peacekeeping operations on the Dniester River be explained?

- First of all I would like to clarify that such statements came not only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova and the EU representatives, but also, which in my opinion is very important, from the U.S. Foreign Service. Because it is just the USA that has announced itself to stand for the demilitarization of the conflict zone. In my opinion, it is in this statement that you can find many answers to the questions. It is absolutely obvious that the presence of Russian peacekeepers is a guarantee of peace and stability in this difficult region. In a region where interests of a number of regional and global geopolitical players converge. I would not like to deal with inventions, but it?s amazing that this conflict took place at the very moment of the regime change in the TMR after the intense presidential election campaign, and, it is entirely possible that someone really wanted to try the strength of the peacekeeping operation in the region, and the de facto established statehood of Transnistria. Therefore, responding to a question, how can such statements be explained, I think that the answer lies in geopolitics and in the interests of the forces concerned about the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria.

I would like to add - after the tragic incident that occurred on January 1, a classic information campaign has started to escalate the situation, directed against the Russian peacekeeping force. Firstly there were pickets at the post of peacekeepers, even provocations against the checkpoint No. 9, then protest actions of young people in Moldova itself, and finally, more recently resources of the Moldovan diaspora have been involved, in particular the Russian Embassy pickets in Romania and France. All this is accompanied by a massive information campaign in the media of Moldova and the West and it looks like a carefully orchestrated campaign that quite fits itself in the geopolitical scheme I have said above.

- Which sides are entitled to take a decision on keeping or changing the format of the peacekeeping operation?

- Of course, a similar solution can only be accepted by the Allied Control Commission that controls the peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone. It will be recalled that in the peacekeeping force there are not only representatives of the Russian side, but also those of Transdnistrian, Moldovan and Ukrainian sides. And as far as I know, no decision on the issue has been considered by authorized bodies. Unlike some of the statements appearing in the media about the alleged reduction of the peacekeeping force, which can be also explained by the same information campaign. Even in the Moldavia itself there is no unambiguous opinion on the need to change the format of the peacekeeping operation and all the cries that come from nationalists on this issue are a flagrant provocation.

- In your opinion, who is responsible for the incident, and were legitimate the actions of the Russian peacekeepers that used a weapon in this situation?

- This question can be answered as follows: all conclusions can be drawn only after the investigation into the causes of the incident, which has not yet completed, and all attempts to accuse the Russian peacekeepers are at least unethical. So far one thing is clear ? the Moldovan citizen, who died on January 1, did not comply absolutely with reasonable requirements of the peacekeepers acting strictly according to the rules. All subsequent conclusions will be made by the commission. There is nothing to do but wait for the investigation results.

Russia’s Bulava Carrying Sub to Enter Service by June

2012-01-21T23:11:00.000+02:00

Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarine, the Yury Dolgoruky, will be put into operation in the second quarter of the year, the United Shipbuilding Corporation said on Friday.

The Borey-class Project 955 sub will be armed with the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missilesbut a USC representative said it was yet to be decided when the troubled missile will enter service.

The sub’s construction began in 1996 at the Sevmash shipyard and was completed in 2008. It has a crew of 130 and will be armed with 16 Bulava SLBMs and six SS-N-15 cruise missiles.

President Dmitry Medvedev said in late December that the flight tests of the Bulava SLBM were completed and it will now be adopted for service with the Russian Navy.

Russia successfully test launched two Bulava missiles on December 23.

They were the 18th and 19th test launches of the troubled Bulava. Only 11 launches have been officially declared successful.

But some analysts suggest that in reality the number of failures is considerably larger. Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer said that of the Bulava's first 12 test launches, only one was entirely successful.

Despite several previous failures, officially blamed on manufacturing faults, the Russian military has insisted that there is no alternative to the Bulava.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) SLBM, developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (since 1998), carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage ballistic missile is designed for deployment on Borey-class nuclear submarines.

Who Stands to Gain from the Karabakh Conflict?

2012-01-21T23:05:00.001+02:00

Who Stands to Gain from the Karabakh Conflict?

Valery TumanovIncoming information about the intensive rearmament carried out in the armies of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) suggests that the Karabakh many years conflict is under increasing strain and armed hostilities there could resumeThe war in Nagorno-Karabakh was stopped in 1994 when the warring parties concluded a truce. But although 17 years have passed from the moment of its signing it has not brought lasting peace, because negotiations of many years, the search for a compromise never gave the desired result. And this lack of any progress in the negotiation process, the stubborn defense of the own position without the desire to make mutual concessions is a major cause of deterioration of the situation. Both sides are stressed and rattling weapons, although a deadlock of the problem solving by military means is obvious. Then this brings up a natural question: ?Who stands to gain from the Karabakh conflict, who is interested in its continuation??

To speak about the war supporters in Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is easy to see that they are political adversaries of the prevailing authorities in both countries. Both Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, and Serzh Sargsyan, Armenian President, have plenty of enemies that try to seize power. And they use the Karabakh map to overthrow the current leadership, accusing it of betraying the national interest, inability to negotiate, cowardice, and other ?sins?.

The War Party in Baku calls for revenge - because as a result of the Karabakh war Azerbaijan has lost, by estimations of Baku politicians, 20 percent of its territory. We mean Nagorno-Karabakh itself and several surrounding districts occupied by its military units, including the strategically most important of them ? Lachin, being a bridge connecting Karabakh with Armenia. But Ilham Aliyev, in spite of the statements made several times on Baku?s readiness to resolve the conflict by force, yet still takes care, remembering that exactly his father, Heydar Aliyev, was a major supporter of the armistice, calling the Karabakh war ?madness?.

However, to reflect the accusations of his political opponents of ?betrayal? and ?cowardice?, he from time to time makes belligerent statements and intensively re-arms the army, which had showed low fighting efficiency during the war of the early 1990s.

Serge Sargsyan is also induced by the opposition that rejects the search for compromise, insisting on the firmness and obstinacy, and calls useless all negotiations with Azerbaijan. Sargsyan has to reckon with the pressure applied on him (so much so he remembers the fate of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, prematurely resigned because of his desire to make peace with Azerbaijan even at the cost of some concessions) and requires from Baku the recognition of the NKR, which for Ilham Aliyev is, of course, unacceptable. Sargsyan understands this, but simply can not behave differently, in order not to lose power. And he is busy with rearming the army, walking, as usual, after a rule: ?If you wish peace, prepare for war"

But besides domestic supporters of the continuation of the Karabakh conflict and even its transfer to a military stage, there are external forces interested in the aggravation of the situation, helping the adversaries to arm. Accusations against Russia that are sometimes heard are absolutely groundless, because Moscow in addition to being a mediator in peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan and making every effort to achieve their success, is vitally interested in a peaceful Caucasus. The resumption of war could greatly complicate and even blow up the situation in the North Caucasus being already not very quiet because of terrorist threats, which would be fraught with very serious consequences for Moscow.

But the resumption of war, the continuation of the Karabakh conflict seem to suit the USA. First, because of the fact that this war will worsen the situation in the North Caucasus and will cause Russia nothing but trouble. It will be remembered in this connection that Washington in the 1990s supported the Chechen separatists, and even the U.S. State Department received their emissaries. And, secondly, Americans have long shown great interest in the South Caucasus, mainly due to the oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan, and they would like to gain a foothold in this strategically important region. In Tbilisi, they hold strong positions thanks to the pro-American Mikhail Saakashvili, and would like to have equally strong ones in Baku and Yerevan. Causing a clash once again between the warring parties, they could afterwards act as peacemakers, showing Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan Moscow?s helplessness in conflict resolution and conversely, their exceptional usefulness.

Precisely for this reason Washington has repeatedly offered to send its peacekeeping force in the conflict zone and at the same time urges Baku and Yerevan on a new war. Americans on the one hand already help Azerbaijan to rearm, on the other - offer the same services to Armenia, where the Russian military base is located, something the Americans do not want. In short, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh promises considerable dividends to Washington that promise assistance to both countries.

Also Turkey, Azerbaijan?s longtime ally, is urging Baku on the resumption of war. It actively supplies the latest offensive weapon to this country - not only for allied reasons but also because of its openly hostile relations with Armenia Ankara refuses to recognize the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, which makes impossible, according to Yerevan, even the simple establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries.

Turkey cannot but understand how it is dangerous for Azerbaijan the continuation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but still urges Baku on power methods, promising its support, assuring of success of hostilities, if Ilham Aliyev follows Ankara?s and its military specialists? advices.

It should be said that Armenia is supported by the European Union, especially France, where Armenian Diaspora?s influence is quite noticeable. And France, if necessary, will probably help Armenia to re-equip the army. In any event, Yerevan can count on Paris? sympathy.

So, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh can become a reality. And this largely due to the fact that there are countries interested in it, and even provoking it.

Πρόκληση μέσω ΑΠΕ κατά Ρωσίας: Mιλάνε για "καθεστώς του Πούτιν"

2012-01-20T13:48:00.001+02:00

Πρόκληση μέσω ΑΠΕ κατά Ρωσίας: Mιλάνε για "καθεστώς του Πούτιν"Στο τηλεγράφημά του το ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ χαρακτηρίζει την δημοκρατικά εκλεγμένη κυβέρνηση του Ρώσου πρωθυπουργού Β.Πούτιν ως "καθεστώς" (!) χαρακτηρισμοί που βέβαια αποδίδονται σε ολοκληρωτικές κυβερνήσεις τύπου Βόρειας Κορέας, Συρίας κλπ. Συγκεκριμένα στο κείμενο αναφέρεται ότι "Το καθεστώς του Πούτιν, ο οποίος είναι υποψήφιος για μια τρίτη θητεία στο Κρεμλίνο, αντιμετωπίζει κίνημα αμφισβήτησης που ξέσπασε μετά τις βουλευτικές εκλογές της 4ης Δεκεμβρίου, τις οποίες κέρδισε το κυβερνών κόμμα Ενωμένη Ρωσία και οι οποίες στιγματίσθηκαν από νοθεία, σύμφωνα με παρατηρητές και την αντιπολίτευση. Πηγή: ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ".

Πρωτοφανή χαρακτηρισμό για την ρωσική κυβέρνηση και προσωπικά για τον Ρώσο πρωθυπουργό Β.Πούτιν και βέβαιο επόμενο πρόεδρο της Ρωσίας, χρησιμοποιεί σε τηλεγράφημά του το ελληνικό κρατικό Αθηναϊκό Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων, του οποίου φυσικά η μετάδοση των ειδήσεων βρίσκεται υπό τον απόλυτο έλεγχο της κυβέρνησης.

"Το καθεστώς του Πούτιν" λοιπόν για το κυβερνητικό ΑΠΕ! Δηλαδή τι θα έπρεπε να λένε στην ελληνική κυβέρνηση για τον Τ.Μπους που στις εκλογές το 2000 στις ΗΠΑ με τις "μαϊμού" ψήφος στο Μαϊάμια και την εκλογή που έστησε ο αδελφός του, επίσης κυβερνήτης του Μαϊάμι" απέναντι στον Αλ Γκορ, κέρδισε την προεδρία έστω και αν είχε πολύ λιγότερες ψήφους πανελλαδικά.
Είναι πραγματικά εντωπωσιακό το πως λειτουργούν απόλυτα ανθελληνικά οι κυβερνήσεις Παπανδρέου και Παπαδήμου απέναντι στην Ρωσία, τόσο με την περίφημη δήλωση του ΥΠΕΞ για την ρωσική διαμαρτυρία στην προφυλάκιση του Εφραίμ, όσο και για την δήλωση αναφορικά με τους αγωγούς, όπου "σβήνεται" από τον χάρτη ο South Stream.
Ως αντανάκλαση αυτών των κινήσεων, η Ρωσία έχει διατυπώσει τον σκεπτικισμό της στο ΔΝΤ, ως προς την επιτυχία του προγράμματος PSI και για την σκοπιμότητα συμμετοχής του ΔΝΤ σε μία τέτοια συμφωνία.
Η στάση της Ρωσίας έχει συμπαρασύρει και ολόκληρη την ομάδα των BRICS σε αρνητική θέση έναντι της Ελλάδας και σημειώνουμε ότι με την δανειοδότηση του ΔΝΤ κατά 20 δισ. δολάρια από το "καθεστώς Πούτιν" που λέει και το ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ, η Ρωσία παίζει πλέον σημαίνοντα ρόλο στο ΔΝΤ.
Με απλά λόγια, οι κυβερνώντες κατάφεραν και έβαλαν τη Ρωσία απέναντί μας. Αυτό, όντως είναι επιτυχία. Για τους εχθρούς της χώρας...
Τμήμα ειδήσεων defencenet.gr

The situation around the Strait of Hormuz

2012-01-20T13:02:00.003+02:00

Russian Black Sea fleet ship to take part in joint naval drills with Italy

2012-01-20T12:53:00.001+02:00

Russian Black Sea fleet ship to take part in joint naval drills with Italy

The Smetlivy anti-submarine ship of Russia'sBlack Sea Fleet will leave its home port of Sevastopol later on Sunday and head to the Mediterranean Sea to prepare for the Ioniex 2011 Russian-Italian naval exercise, a Russian Defense Ministry spokesman said.
The drill will take place in early November, he said. The Ioniex exercise is held every two years as part of the cooperation program between the Russianand Italian navies.
The Smetlivy, a Kashin class guided missile destroyer, was built in the 1960s and modernized in the mid-1990s. The ship is equipped with (SS-N-25 Switchblade, Harpoonski) short-range surface-to-surface cruise missiles and MNK-300 sonar. Russia’s rescue ship Epron will also be involved in the drill, the spokesman added. In 2010, the Ladny frigate and Shakhtyor rescue tug of the Black Sea Fleet participated in the Ioniex exercise.

china's anti ship ballistic missile DF 21

2012-01-19T16:06:00.002+02:00

china's anti ship ballistic missile fotos

>> Full information here <<

Military Info ...collected from the web

2012-01-19T15:26:00.000+02:00

Info collected and presented from http://geimint.blogspot.com/ IMINT & Analysis

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The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps by Sean O’Connor
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N11%20December%202011.pdf

Umm Aitiqah AB, Libya
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N10%20November%202011.pdf

Air Defense Russia
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N9%20October%202011.pdf

Varyag Begins Sea Trials
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N8%20September%202011.pdf

Iranian Silos “Unveiled”
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N6%20July%202011.pdf

Chinese Naval Airpower Developments
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N5%20June%202011.pdf

Pakistan and Bin Laden
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N4%20May%202011.pdf

The Libyan Lesson
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N3%20April%202011.pdf

China’s Hybrid SAM Sites
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/55473237/V1N2%20March%202011.pdf

Russian Navy Carrier Group Entered Mediterranean

2011-12-30T23:48:00.002+02:00

Russian Navy Carrier Group Entered Mediterranean

26.12.2011

Text: Western Military District Press Service
Photo: Western Military District Press Service

Northern Fleet (NF) aircraft-carrying cruiserAdmiral Kuznetsov on Dec 23 passed Gibraltar Strait and entered the Mediterranean Sea.

Other ships of the carrier strike group passed the strait few hours earlier.

In accordance with further plans, the Russian Navy's task force consisting of NF large ASW ship Admiral Chabanenko, Baltic Fleet (BF) frigate Yaroslav Mudry, and NF tanker Sergei Osipov will pay a formal visit to Spanish port Ceuta.

Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and other supply vessels in the nearest time will head for anchorage site in western part of the Mediterranean Sea in order to replenish the carrier's supplies.

Black Sea Fleet (BSF) frigate Ladny joined the carrier group on Friday, Dec 23.

The long-range cruise started on Dec 6 when Admiral Kuznetsov, large ASW ship Admiral Chabanenko, and auxiliary vessels departed from Northern Fleet's main base. As for now, the carrier group has covered over 4,000 nautical miles.

The interfleet force was shaped on Dec 12 when BF frigate Yaroslav Mudry joined the carrier group in the Moray Firth.

Heading through the Atlantic, crews of the carrier group were improving naval skills and performed dozens of drills within the interfleet grouping. Air wing carried out training flights; deck-based fighters and helicopters practiced takeoffs and landings on board the aircraft carrier and other warships.

In the Mediterranean Sea, Russian naval mariners will proceed with drills within the interfleet task force. Training flights of deck-based aviation will be continued as well.

Проект 22350

2011-11-25T13:08:00.000+02:00

Проект 22350

Venezuela To Get 15 Billion Dollar Arms Including J-10 Jets

2011-03-27T13:32:00.000+03:00

Venezuela To Get 15 Billion Dollar Arms Including J-10 Jets

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez thrown more than 15 billion U.S. dollars worth of arms procurement bill, which sparked concerns in Latin America.

The article said that Venezuela's purchase of a large number of tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, submarines and missile systems at an unprecedented rate in history in Latin America to arm themselves.

"New Herald" (El Nuevo Herald), said experts consulted, Chavez spent over 15 billion U.S. dollars worth to strengthen its military power for military procurement, has produced unrest in the region. Analysts warned that the arms purchase along with people doubt, there is no competitive bidding and early course of the study, the way decisions are temporary.

It is learned that Chavez used the funds to purchase these new weapons in the country one of the largest in history, and a large part from the loan; for the military procurement funds may end up more than 15 billion U.S. dollars.

Some analysts said that the funds have been used for arms purchases totaled about 300 billion U.S. dollars; and this figure is Chavez himself expressed the hope that the modernization of the national armed forces in the amount spent.

Closely track the event of a Venezuela and Africa-governmental organization"National Security and Civil Defense Control Association," the report said, the country has received or will receive a large number of mainly by Russia, China and Spain to provide the equipment and military facilities.
These weapons include: 92 medium-sized T-72B1V tanks, 240 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-3 and BTR-80), 9 submarines, nearly 50 various types of ships, a dozen Su-30MK2 fighters, undetermined number of Chinese J -10 fighters, and nearly 100 Russian helicopter; most of these equipment will be used for combat operations.

25th March 2011

2011-03-25T12:53:00.000+02:00

Explora

2011-03-25T08:54:00.000+02:00

Ship Name: OGS EXPLORA

IMO: 7310868

MMSI: 247028700

Callsign: IXWQ

Flag: Italy

Category: Other

Beam: 12

Length: 73

Draught: 5.5

maping the strikes

2011-03-22T17:40:00.000+02:00

have a look>>> http://www.defense.gov/news/PAO_DJS_Slides_19Mar11_v3.pdf

Following the initial cruise missile strikes on 19 March, the Pentagon released a document illustrating the general areas where targets were attacked. As expected for an attack on Libyan IADS architecture, the strike locations corresponded to regions with deployed EW assets and S-75, S-125, and S-200 missile batteries.

The graphic below illustrates the post-strike state of the Libyan IADS, presuming that all SAM systems were disabled in regions targeted by cruise missile strikes.

While the Qaddafi regime is no longer assessed to control operational strategic SAM batteries in the NFZ region, numerous EW facilities still remain. These facilities allow the regime to maintain a degree of situational awareness, provided they are not under constant electronic attack. Furthermore, no effort was made to strike S-75 or S-125 batteries deep inland. Sabha is still defended by an S-75 and S-125 battery, and contains a garrison facility which could be used to reconstitute SAM units damaged or destroyed in the March 19th attacks.

If the coalition is unwilling to strike targets outside the established NFZ, the Qaddafi regime may be able to transport SAM components to its periphery. This would theoretically enable targets operating in the southern portions of the NFZ to be engaged, creating an interesting scenario where the coalition would have to either restrict flight in sections of the NFZ or attack targets outside of the NFZ to maintain its integrity. Such a course of action could potentially see increased protest from nations such as China and India, bringing into question the continued value and effectiveness of the NFZ as a whole. Also, Western nations attacking targets outside of the NFZ could result in a significant loss of support from the Arab League.

If there is a lesson to be learned from the March 19th decapitation strikes on Qaddafi's IADS, it is that nations relying on Soviet-era SAM systems no longer pose a significant threat to a modern, well-equipped military arm. While current-generation Russian-made SAM systems rank among the most sophisticated and capable in the world, the era in which nations could rely on elderly Soviet-era systems such as the S-75 or S-200 to provide a credible degree of air defense capability has decisively ended. Claims by the Pentagon that Libya possessed a high-threat IADS network were technologically unfounded, in much the same way that the same claims made about iraq in 1991 were also proven to be extreme exaggerations.

Kavoshgar-4 rocket launch into space

2011-03-20T23:56:00.000+02:00

Kavoshgar-4 rocket launch into space

IRNA is reporting that Iran has launched a Kavoshgar-4 (Explorer-4) rocket carrying a test capsule into space on March 15.. All systems of the new rocket were reportedly tested including capsule separation and reentry, as well as biological support with what appears to be a mock primate.

Iran is establishing the technical means to support its publicly declared goal of sending a human into space by 2022.

Launch photos provided by IRNA

Libyan NFZ

2011-03-20T23:42:00.000+02:00

On 17 March 2011 the UNSC voted to enforce a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya, in response to the conflict between Qaddafi's regime and separatist forces. The Libyan military operates numerous Soviet-era strategic SAM systems which represent the most likely threat to allied aircraft enforcing the NFZ. Libyan SAM systems include the S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON). Numerous AAA, MANPADS', and tactical SAM systems are also operated, but represent a considerably reduced threat given their limited effectiveness above 20,000 feet.

LIBYAN SAM DEPLOYMENT

The graphic presented below illustrates the pre-conflict state of Libyan strategic air defenses. Major military airfields, active EW radar sites, and operational strategic SAM coverage zones are marked. It should be noted that the graphics presented here depict identified dedicated EW facilities. Many SAM batteries possess their own organic EW elements; simply targeting the known EW facilities does not necessarily prevent the SAM force from receiving the target track data necessary to prosecute an engagement.

The majority of contested territory is along the northern coastline of Libya, shown in the graphic below. This is advantageous to any allied aircraft entering the theater of operations, as they do not have to travel deep into Libya to enforce the NFZ in support of separatist forces. Furthermore, ISR and support aircraft can be operated offshore under the protection of CAPs and naval air defense systems.

Separatist forces are concentrated along the eastern coastline of the nation from Benghazi to Tobruk and the Egyptian border. As the air defense forces in these regions are likely no longer under Qaddafi's control, the graphic below indicates the likely pro-Qaddafi SAM threat picture facing NFZ operations.

Numerous SAM garrisons and unoccupied, prepared strategic SAM sites present an opportunity for pro-Qaddafi forces to reinforce their positions prior to the start of NFZ operations. Reinforcing the strategic SAM network in this fashion will present an increased SAM threat to allied aircraft and offer increased overlapping coverage zones around key military installations. A potential reinforced pro-Qaddafi SAM network is illustrated in the graphic below.

The majority of the command and control facilities for the pro-Qaddafi regime, as well as the seat of power, are consolidated in and around the capital of Tripoli. The following two graphics depict the current operational SAM network around Tripoli, as well as a potentially reinforced network employing currently inactive positions.

ENFORCING THE NFZ

The true nature of the SAM threat to NFZ operations will become apparent when operations commence. Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire region, it is likely that SEAD or DEAD operations will commence against the bulk of identified pro-Qaddafi SAM sites. However, should NFZ enforcement be limited initially to protecting separatist-controlled areas in the eastern portion of the nation, it is possible that few of the pro-Qaddafi SAM sites would be targeted as they would be unable to engage allied aircraft.

The exception to the latter scenario is the S-200. The S-200 enjoys a 250 km range against cooperative targets such as ISR and support aircraft. Given that allied aircraft will likely be based out of European territories or operate from USN CVNs, heavy use of inflight refueling should be expected. Eliminating pro-Qaddafi S-200 batteries would enable allied ISR and support aircraft to operate much closer to the Libyan coastline.

Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire nation and consequently engage active S-75 and S-125 SAM batteries, the capability of the pro-Qaddafi SAM network could be significantly degraded with a relatively small number of sorties. The Libyan SAM inventory is constrained by the reliance on Soviet-era systems. The S-75, S-125, and S-200 are limited by the fact that each engagement radar can only prosecute a single target. S-200 batteries are often bolstered by multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars to allow the battery to engage multiple targets, but the single-target limitation significantly reduces the effectiveness of the network as a whole. Furthermore, over-reliance on aging technology places the network at significant risk for electronic warfare interference. The US military, for example, has faced the S-75 and S-125 over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia and is well-versed on countertactics and electronic attack procedures to mitigate the threat posed by such systems. While measures may have been taken to allow the S-75 and S-125 to remain viable in Libyan service, at this point they do not present significant risks to a modern military force. That is not to suggest that they present no risk whatsoever, but rather that they are no longer considered to be high-threat systems based on their age and known technical performance.

Aerial attacks against separatist positions appear to have been curtailed in favor of ground assault and artillery bombardment. In this light, the provision of the NFZ calling for protection of civillian under threat from pro-Qaddafi forces could allow operations over regime-controlled areas. A potential military campaign could begin with strikes against SAM positions and EW facilities, followed by strikes against pro-Qaddafi forces threatening or engaged with separatist forces, particularly those near Benghazi. Given the limited number of SAM sites located in territory held by the Qaddafi regime, it is likely that the capability of the strategic SAM network to prosecute targets could be significantly curtailed within 24 hours. Cruise missiles could be employed to strike identified SAM sites, forgoing the expense of a significant SEAD or DEAD operation and allowing combat aircraft to be tasked to protect separatist forces.

CONCLUSION

With the decision to enact a NFZ over Libya, the strategic SAM network represents the most significant threat to allied aircraft tasked with its enforcement. However, due to the single-target engagement capability of Libyan S-75 and S-125 batteries, the network is far less capable than it appears at first glance. Libya negotiated for the purchase of S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) advanced SAM systems from Russia in 2010 but at this date no sale has been completed and no deliveries have been reported. Had Libya moved to upgrade its air defense network in recent years, the issue of allied aircraft enforcing a NFZ could have become a far more complicated task. Once again, a nation relying on an aged air defense network will potentially be at risk in large part because it failed to upgrade its capability. As an interesting footnote, it will be important to monitor Iran following the cessation of action against Qaddafi's regime. Perhaps the destruction of yet another aging air defense network will be the final catalyst pushing Iran to modernize it's own defenses.

The Libyan SAM Network

2011-02-21T23:41:00.000+02:00

The Libyan SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

Libya possesses one of the most robust air defense networks on the African continent, falling second only to Egypt in terms of coverage and operational systems. Libyan strategic SAM assets are primarily arrayed along the coastline, ostensibly defending the bulk of the Libyan population and preventing foreign incursion into Libyan airspace.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

Libyan strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Defense Forces, which in turn are subordinate to the Libyan Air Force. Currently believed to be divided into five separate regional commands, the Air Defense Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently serving within the Libyan Air Defense Force: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Seventeen active and four inactive EW sites provide Libya's military with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are located primarily along the western and eastern coastal regions, monitoring the airspace around Tripoli and Benghazi. Identified EW radars operating in Libya are predominately Soviet-era systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)

In addition, Libya is reported to have received five Italian LPD-20 air search radars in 1983 and three Soviet 5N69 (BIG BACK) EW radars between 1984 and 1985. None of these systems have been identified in available imagery, but that does not preclude their existance.

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in Libya:
The following image depicts a notional Libyan EW site, located near Sabha in the western portion of the nation's interior. This is representative of roughly one third of Libya's EW sites. Five sites are only fitted with P-12/18 series radars, with five being fitted with multiple radar systems. The P-12/18 sites likely serve to bolster or extend coverage, with the five sites containing multiple EW radars possibly serving as the command centers for the aforementioned regional commands.
Some strategic SAM sites contain their own organic EW elements. This allows them to perform independent target acquisition, or to accept long-range track handoff from regional EW centers. Seven SAM sites, four S-75 and three S-200, have identified EW assets. S-75 sites feature P-12/18 radars, with S-200 sites featuring P-14 radars. No S-125 sites, and the remaining S-75 and S-200 sites, contain identified EW assets, but this is likely due to the quality of available imagery rather than a lack of assets.

The following image depicts a deployed P-12/18 EW radar at an S-75 site near Tripoli:
SAM Coverage

There are currently thirty one active strategic SAM sites located in Libya. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the same coastal regions featuring the bulk of the EW assets.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified Libyan strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
S-75

There are currently eleven active S-75 sites inside of Libya, constituting roughly one third of the strategic SAM force. Russian sources claim that thirty nine S-75M Volkhov batteries were supplied to Libya between 1974 and 1985. Other sources suggest that the initial order of eighteen batteries supplied between 1974 and 1975 consisted of S-75 Dvina systems. S-75 batteries are deployed to protect key population centers and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-75 batteries:
S-125

There are currently sixteen active S-125 sites inside of Libya. Eight batteries are situated on former S-75 sites. The S-125 represents half of the deployed strategic SAM assets in the nation. Libya operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with thirty three batteries being supplied between 1974 and 1976. As with the S-75, S-125 batteries are deployed to protect key population and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-125 batteries:
S-200

There are currently four active S-200 sites inside of Libya, each site being equipped with two batteries. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the Libyan arsenal. The proximity of these four locations to the coastline allows them to range far out into the Mediterranean, theoretically providing a significant standoff engagement capability. Six S-200 batteries were initially supplied to Libya between 1985 and 1986, with a further five being delivered in 1988. There is some confusion as to which variant Libya operates. Russian sources refer to the system delivered as the S-200VE, but the SIPRI arms trade register refers to the system as the Angara, implying that the longer-range S-200DE was delivered.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-200 batteries. A range of 300 kilometers is used, corresponding to the Angara variant.
Tactical SAM Systems

The Libyan Army operates various tactical SAM ssytems which could be called upon to provide point defense of serve as gap fillers in the overall air defense network. These systems include the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), 9K33 Osa (SA-8 GECKO), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 GASKIN), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 GOPHER), and Crotale. While the 9K33 is the most numerous system, the 2K12 represents the msot capable tactical SAM system.

Inactive Sites

There are currently thirty identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya. There are fifteen S-75 sites, eleven S-125 sites, and four S-200 sites. These sites are all located within areas featuring active SAM batteries. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering the defenses of a given region during hostilities, drawing on equipment held in garrison, or they may represent dispersal locations for the realignment of SAM deployments over time.

To support the latter concept, it should be noted that five inactive sites, two S-75, one S-125, and two S-200, have hosted operational batteries at some point in the past. Also, three S-125 and one S-200 site currently operational were noted as being inactive at some point in the past. This suggests that there is a policy of redeployment and reorganization that occurs. Militarily this is a sound strategy, as it complicates the targeting of these facilities by a potential aggressor. While it is true that new site locations can be deduced by imagery or ELNT analysis, it adds to the workload of pre-strike planners.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya:
Support Facilities

Eleven facilities provide logistical support for the overall strategic SAM network. Ten of these facilities are SAM garrisons housing undeployed equipment and missile reloads, with the remaining facility being a dedicated SAM training complex. Seven of the SAM garrisons are generic facilities supporting multiple systems. Based on the identification of system components in available imagery, two of the remaining SAM garrisons appear to solely support the S-75, with the remaining garrison supporting the S-125. All garrisons are located in the vicinity of prepared launch sites.

The following image depicts a combined S-75/125 garrison complex near Tripoli:
The following image depicts the Libyan SAM training complex near Misratah:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

Libyan strategic SAM assets are arranged to provide a layered air defense zone with overlapping fields of fire. S-75 and S-125 batteries are located in close proximity to provide both redundancy and support, with the S-125 being more capable at lower altitudes than the S-75. The large number of inactive sites suggests that the force has been drawn down over time. This could be due to service life issues, equipment failure, financial reasons, or the expenditure of missile stocks.

National S-200 Coverage

The first line of defense in Libya's strategic SAM network is the S-200. Positioned along the coastline, the four active S-200 batteries provide a credible deterrent to high-RCS cooperative targets such as ISR platforms. S-200 batteries are located near Tripoli, Misratah, Surt, and Benghazi.

Coastal Coverage

Libya's S-75 and S-125 sites are concentrated primarily along the western and eastern coastlines. While the S-200 batteries are situated to provide barrier air defense of the nation's coastline, the S-75 and S-125 sites are positioned to provide point defense of assigned areas. From west to east, these sites are arrayed around Ibn Nafa airbase, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, Bombah, and Adam. While contiguous coverage of the coastal region is not provided by these sites, each location is defended by no fewer than three batteries. Ibn Nafa and Bombah are defended by one S-75 and two S-125 batteries, Misratah is defended by one S-75 and three S-125 batteries, and Benghazi and Adam are defended by two S-75 and two S-125 batteries.

The following image depicts the coastal coverage of Libya's S-75 and S-125 batteries, with the locations of the S-200 batteries also marked:
Interestingly, while Surt features an active S-200 battery, all S-75 and S-125 sites in the area are currently inactive. This leaves the coastline along the Gulf of Sidra relatively undefended.

The most heavily defended city is the capitol of Tripoli. Tripoli is defended by three S-75 and four S-125 batteries, with an S-200 battery positioned south of the city. Three SAM garrisons and three EW facilities are also present in the area, as are four inactive SAM sites.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Tripoli:
The following images depict SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near the remaining coastal areas.

Ibn Nafa Airbase
Misratah
Benghazi
Bombah
Adam
Inland Coverage

Sabha is the only inland city within Libya to have any strategic SAM defenses. Much of the Libyan interior is sparsely populated, as are the regions it borders. What then makes Sabha stand out as a location requiring SAM defenses? First, Sabha is believed to have been associated with the defunct Libyan nuclear weapons program. Second, Sabha was home to Libyan rocket development in the early 1980s, when the OTRAG rocket was tested from the Seba Oasis launch facility. There remains a significant military presence in the area, which is likely the ultimate reason for the presence of strategic SAM assets and related support facilities.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Sebha:
Air Defense Issues

Libya's strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key facilities following a point defense strategy, with long-range S-200 systems providing standoff barrier air defense along the coastal region. However, Libya's strategic SAM network has many flaws.

The main drawback of the Libyan strategic SAM network is an overreliance on aging Soviet technology. Russian manufacturers presently produce what are arguably the most advanced and capable land-based strategic SAM systems in the world. Much of their success lies in the fact that they have produced a diverse array of SAM systems with numerous variants. However, this history also presents a problem for nations relying on older technology: the rest of the world has simply passed them by. Advances in electronic warfare and ECM have made many of the older Soviet-era SAM systems obsolete in a modern air combat environment. Libya's S-75, S-125, and S-200 systems are no exception. Furthermore, despite some claims to the contrary, the Libyan strategic SAM force was generally ineffective during hostilities with the United States in the mid 1980s.

In one case, Soviet military officials deduced that the S-200 succeeded in downing three US Navy aircraft in March of 1986, based only on the perception of fragments on the radar readouts and the presence of helicopter activity in the area, the latter being attributed to CSAR efforts. The USN has never disclosed any aircraft losses during the incident, which in and of itself does not indicate that no aircraft were lost, but the other two pieces of "evidence" can easily be explained. The apparent appearance of aircraft fragments on the radar operators' screens could have been attributed to chaff dispersal or radar interference, especially if the aircraft descended below the radar's field of view. Also, helicopter activity is not limited to CSAR operations in the USN; helicopters active at the time could have been performing anti-submarine patrols, searching out and identifying surface contacts, or simply flying proiciency sorties. Whatever the case may be, the evidence does not conclusively indicate that any USN aircraft were downed by S-200s, and if the Russians or Libyans have any evidence to the contrary they have certainly never seen fit to bring it into the open.

Later in 1986, the Libyan strategic SAM network was abused during Operation ELDORADO CANYON, the US military response to Libyan support of terrorism. Lieutenant General Vladimir Yaroshenko, a former officer in the Soviet PVO SAM Troops, was assigned to analyze the poor performance of the Soviet supplied SAM systems in that operation. LTG Yaroshenko has reported his discovery that poor command and control, poor radar coverage, and a lack of appreciation for American anti-radar weapons and tactics precluded effective target engagement. One interesting fact which he mentions is that the S-75 batteries had a minimum engagement altitude of 100 meters, corresponding to the S-75M Volkhov system as mentioned previously. He also confirms that only one US aircraft, an F-111 shot down by AAA fire, was lost, despite Venikian levels of propaganda claiming otherwise at the time.

Part of the current problem stems from international sanctions placed on Libya during the 1980s which effectively stifled any serious chances of upgrading or replacing obsolete systems. The rest of the problem lies in the systems themselves. All three strategic SAM types operated by Libya have been thoroughly exploited by Western intelligence agencies, and many Western nations have faced these same systems in combat at various times, allowing for continued refinement of ECM systems designed to defeat these weapons electronically. Also, no strategic SAM system operated by Libya possesses a multi-target engagement capability. The only SAM sites representing a threat to multiple aircraft are the S-200 locations, as they possess multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars. As such, even though Libyan strategic SAM sites are arrayed to provide overlapping fields of fire while defending a given area, the relatively small number of sites represents a threat to only a small number of targets. As a result, the overall network is easily susceptible to oversaturation.

The second drawback to Libya's strategic SAM network is one of layout. If it is accepted that older Soviet-era systems may still be reliable against regional aggressors lacking modern, sophisticated EW or ECM suites, the system still has a significant number of gaps that could be exploited. The S-200 represents the only significant over water threat, but is constrained by having a minimum engagement altitude of 300 meters. Any terrain-hugging aircraft or cruise missiles would easily be able to exploit this weakness to approach the Libyan coastline. Once the coastline has been reached, the most obvious point of ingress would be the area adjacent to the Gulf of Sidra, which is devoid of deployed strategic SAM assets. Furthermore, as evidenced in the image seen previously, there are gaps between areas covered by S-75 and S-125 batteries which could also be exploited. This does not of course take into account the presence or performance of interceptors, AAA, or tactical SAM units, as these systems are outside the scope of this analysis.

CONCLUSION

At the end of the day, the Libyan strategic SAM network requires a massive infusion of new technology to remain viable in the twenty first century. It was not capable of repelling an attack over twenty years ago, and there is no reason to suspect that it will be capable of such action today. Libya is reportedly negotiating for the purchase of advanced S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) SAM systems from Russia, which would go a long way towards modernizing the network and restoring its effectiveness. Colonel al-Gaddafi has made great strides in bringing Libya back into the community of nations, and deserves a large amount of praise for doing so, but that should not lessen the Libyan government's desire or responsibility to provide adequate defense for its citizens.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Libya and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE and the S-300 case

2011-02-21T18:04:00.000+02:00

CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES

The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.

In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.

Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.

A NEW MISSILE CRISIS

Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.

The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.

The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.

Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.

CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES

While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.

The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:

34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)

The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.

As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.

The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.

The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:

Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.

The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:

The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.

The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:

The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.

THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE

Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.

S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.

The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:

35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)

The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:

The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.

The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:

The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:

Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.

Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.

The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:

The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.

The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:

In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.

Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.

REPLACING THE S-300

With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).

In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.

Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.

The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.

The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.

While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.

CONCLUSION

Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.

prime13

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