Turkey & Chechnya

Turkey & Chechnya

I have already addressed the covert yet fundamental role the West played in the brutal Chechen conflict. We now know that the war in Chechnya was an attempt by foreign powers to breakaway the geostrategically crucial region of Chechnya from Moscow's control. And now, a little information on the Turkish factor in the bloody conflict in Chechnya. It was well known that for many years Turkish volunteers, more specifically members of the extremist pan-Turkist paramilitary organization known as the Grey Wolves, were sent into Chechnya to help Islamic terrorists there fight federal security forces. Obviously, detailed information about Turkey's role in Chechnya, as well as that of the West's, remains classified. As a result, obtaining detailed information about this topic remains elusive.

It was widely known at the time that Chechen terrorists got their logistical support, inspiration and military training primarily from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. It was also reported that the Islamic terror organization known in the West as Al Qaeda was partaking in the anti-Russian activities there as well. Naturally, Western intelligence services were also thought to have been an integral part of the anti-Russian operation in the Caucasus region. Due to obvious political considerations, Western support for terrorists in Chechnya could not be carried out overtly. As a result, Western support for Chechnya was for the most part relegated to covert assistance as well as diplomatic support, humanitarian help and pro-Chechen propaganda in the western world's press.

During various stages of the conflict, it was documented that not only were Chechen terrorists fighting alongside Turks, but their wounded personnel were being transported to Turkey via Georgia for treatment and recuperation. Naturally, the same was being done in Azerbaijan. Moreover, in Azerbaijan, Grey Wolves were participating in anti-Russian, anti-Iranian and anti-Armenian activities in full compliance with their pan-Turkist ideology. During the early 1990s, Turkish military officers, members of the Grey Wolves and personal from Al-Qaeda were said to have participated in battles against Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh.

Nevertheless, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia had become safe-havens for Chechen terrorists for many years. Needless to say, all this was occurring right under the watchful eyes of top level US officials as well as various other Western interests. Doing research on this topic one cannot help but see the unmistakable Turkish flavor in the Chechen rebellion. And despite the Russian Federation's cordial relations with the Turkish state today, Moscow today continues to remain resentful and suspicious of Ankara. Turkish-Russian rivalry goes back hundreds of years, and the two Eurasian powers continue to be natural competitors to this day. Although the Islamic uprising in the Caucasus has been ruthlessly crushed by Moscow, although Ankara's presence in the region in question has diminished greatly, Turks continue being one of Russia's main regional problems. The following are some reports that have gotten my attention.

Arevordi

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TURKISH VOLUNTEERS IN CHECHNYA

План «Кавказ» (Plan Kavkaz Video): http://video.google.com/videoplay?do...L-j6T_Ag&hl=en

For several years Kremlin spokespersons have identified Turkey as the primary source of foreign jihadi volunteers (always referred to as naemniky, "mercenaries" in official proclamations) fighting alongside their Chechen adversaries. One spokesman claimed "We keep killing armed Turkish citizens on Chechen territory" and another described Turkey as "a record breaker for producing foreign mercenaries killed in Chechnya." [1] While skeptics might be tempted to dismiss such claims as mere bluster in light of Turkey's well known secular tendencies, the evidence is mounting that Turkish volunteer fighters make up a sizeable component of the foreign element fighting alongside the indigenous Chechen insurgents in Russia. While it is widely recognized that the 100-200 foreign jihadis fighting alongside the approximately 1,200 Chechen insurgents are led by Arab emirs (commanders) such as the slain Amir Khattab (a Saudi whose mother was Turkish according to jihadist websites), Abu Walid (Saudi killed April 2004), and Abu Hafs al Urdani (aka "Amjet" a Jordanian), the Russian government has consistently maintained that Turks play a prominent role among the foreign "terrorists" in Chechnya. [2] To support their claims, Russian security services have produced Turkish passports found on the bodies of several slain fighters and have given the names and personal details of Turkish jihadis killed in Chechnya. Among others, Russian spokespersons referenced one Ziya Pece, a Turk who was found dead with a grenade launcher following a fire fight with Federal forces. Russian officials have also provided detailed information on 24 Turkish fighters killed between 1999 and 2004, and Russian soldiers in Chechnya have spoken of engaging a unit of 40 skilled Turkish fighters. [3] If this were not compelling enough evidence, Russian security forces have also produced a living Turkish jihadi named Ali Yaman who was captured in the Chechen village of Gekhi-Chu.

A Turkish Platoon in Chechnya

Surprisingly, this evidence is not refuted by Chechen or Turkish jihadi sources and on the contrary has been corroborated on such forums as the kavkaz.org website produced by Arab and Chechen extremists linked to the field commander Shamil Basayev. The following excerpt from a kavkaz interview with a Turkish jihadi commander in Chechnya is illuminating and suggests the existence of a Turkish jamaat known as the "Ottoman platoon" in the Arab-dominated International Islamic Brigade (it also corroborates the above Russian claim that Federal forces have killed 24 Turks in Chechnya): "Interview with the Chief of the Turkish Jamaat ‘Osmanly' (Ottoman) fighting in Chechnya against the troops of Russian invaders, Amir (Commander) Muhtar, by the Kavkaz Center news agency: (Interviewer) Are there many Turks in Chechnya today? Some mass media were reporting that there are about 20 of you guys.

(Amir Muhtar) Out of the first Jamaat that was fighting in 1995-1996 seven mujahideen have remained. Back then there were 13 of us. They are actually the core of the Turkish jamaat in Chechnya today. Twenty-four Turks have already died in this war. Among them was Zachariah, Muhammed-Fatih, Halil…Three mujahideen became shaheeds (martyrs) during the battle with commandos from Pskov in the vicinity of Ulus-Kert. Some died before that in the battles in Jokhar (Grozny). Five were wounded." [4] In February 2004 a Turkish jihadi website devoted to Chechnya also announced the martyrdom (shehid olmak) of three Turkish mujahideen in just two weeks. [5] Another site that has been removed left the following account of the combat that led to the martyrdom of three Turkish jihadi fighters: "Last night we had news from verifiable sources that a group of Turkish mujahideen came across Russian soldiers north of Vedeno in a small village. After stumbling on them a fire fight ensued and one Algerian and three Turkish brothers died. The Algerian's name is Hassam and the Turkish brothers' names are Ebu Derda, Huzeyfe and Zennun. These brothers fought in Commander Ramazan's unit in the Dagestan conflict." [6]

For several years now Turkish jihadi websites have actually been posting the martyrdom epitaphs of Turkish fighters who died in the Chechen cihad. Much of the jihadist rhetoric found on these Islamist sites will be familiar to those who follow the martyrdom obituaries of foreign jihadis who have died fighting in Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict zones. The following account, for example, describes the fate of a Turkish fighter who followed the well worn path of roaming Turkish jihadis in the Balkans before being killed: "Shaheed Bilal Al-Qaiseri (Uthman Karkush). 23 years old from Qaiseri, Turkey. Martyred during the Withdrawal from Grozny, February 2000: Bilal fought for six months in Bosnia during 1995 from where he unsuccessfully attempted to travel to Chechnya. He went to fight for the Jihad in Kosova but returned after a month when the fighting ceased. He came to Chechnya in August 1999 where he participated in the Dagestan Operations in Botlikh. After the Mujahideen withdrew, he was planning to return to Turkey when Russia invaded Chechnya. He participated in the fighting in Argun and, subsequently, Grozny. Before and throughout Ramadan he cooked for the Mujahideen in his group. During the fighting he was distinguished for his bravery. After seeing a dream in which he was married, he decided to marry a Chechen, but Shahaadah (martyrdom) was destined for him instead. He was severely injured during the withdrawal from Grozny in the village of Katyr Yurt where his room received a direct hit from Russian Grad Artillery. He was later martyred from his injuries in the village of Shami Yurt."

Ethnicity and Turkish jihad in Chechnya

The following epitah, which describes a Turkish martyr "with some Chechen ancestry" speaks of a deeper and less obvious current in the Turkish jihadi movement that delineates Turkish volunteer fighters from the majority of trans-national Arab jihadis fighting in Chechnya: "Shamil (Afooq Qainar). 25 years old from Istanbul, Turkey.

Martyred in Grozny, November 1999:

With some Chechen ancestory, he deeply loved Chechnya and was more often alongside Chechens than Turks. He had also participated in the Chechen Jihad of 1996-99. With his good manners, polite demeanor and modesty, he got along well with everyone. He also took part in the Dagestan Jihad in the Novalak Region where, notably, his group fought their way out of a Russian siege at a cost of 25 Shaheed (martyrs). He was martyred in the second month of this War (November 1999) in Grozny." [7]

While it might be overlooked, the fact that the slain Shamil is, like many of his compatriots, of Chechen extraction, is of tremendous importance. It would seem that many Turks who volunteer to fight on the behalf of the Chechens do so because they have ethnic origins in the Caucasus region or identify with the Chechens as irkdashlar (kin).

In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia instigated a brutal policy of ethnic cleansing that saw tens of thousands of indigenous Caucasian highlanders expelled to Anatolia. While public expressions of Laz, Circassian, Kosovar, Bosniak, Tatar and Chechen ethnic identity were subsequently discouraged in officially homogenous Republican Turkey, folk traditions such as the famous Caucasian highlander sword dances, Albanian borek (pastry), Crimean Tatar destans (legends), and ritualized commemoration of past victimization at the hands of Russians, Serbs, Bulgarians and others continued.

It was only with the liberalization of Turkey under President Turgut Ozal in the early 1990s that these historical sub-ethnic grievances could be expressed in the public sphere. As this unprecedented celebration of ethnicity and commemoration of past repression took place in a liberalizing Turkey, Turks were confronted with horrifying images from the Balkans and Caucasus. Stories of rape camps in Bosnia, mass graves in Kosovo, and televised images of columns of pitiful Chechen refugees in Russia struck many Turks as a replay of the apocalyptic destruction of millions of Balkan-Caucasian-Ukrainian Muslims by Orthodox Christians in the 19th century.

As a result, informants interviewed by the author in Turkey in the summer of 2004 claimed that many young men from villages in Eastern Turkey inhabited by people of Caucasian origin were told by their family patriarchs to go and fight for their honor, faith, and ancestral homeland in Chechnya. Moreover, with the advent of the internet in Turkey, gruesome images of horribly mutilated Chechen women and children, mass burials and vandalized mosques appeared on Islamist and secular-nationalist websites alike and enraged many traditionalists in the country. In this climate, both nationalists and religious extremists exploited many Turks' sense of ethnic or religious solidarity with their Chechen "brothers and sisters" and invoked strong feelings of namus (a traditional sense of machismo, pride and honor among Turks that comes from the defense of faith, family, motherland, and honor of one's women).

Like the Turks who continue to fight and die in Chechnya, the websites that glorify the defense of the Chechens run the gamut from the anti-American/Zionist rhetoric of the Islamists to the nationalist irredentism of the Pan-Turkists. But the latter predominate. [8] The pro-Chechen websites with an ethnic dimension tend to feature images of Turks wearing traditional Caucasian folk costumes and 19th century anti-Russian heroes. Others with a slightly more nationalist bent (such as www.kafka.4t.com/photos.html) blend images of Ataturk and Alparslan Turkes (the founder of the Turkish xxx Kurt-Grey Wolves extreme nationalist party) with images from Chechnya. As these sites make clear, many Turks who fight in Chechnya are engaging in the same sort of volunteerism that led Albanian Americans to go fight in Kosovo in 1999 under the auspices of Homeland Calling and other widely recognized diasporic organizations.

This ethnic diaspora narrative might also explain some of the Arab jihadi participation in Chechnya. Many Chechen refugees settled in Ottoman Jordan following their expulsion from Russia in the 19th century. Jordanian Arabs of Chechen extraction, such as the influential Sheikh Muhammad Fatih, have played an important role in the Chechen jihad as warriors, preachers, and fund raisers.

Notwithstanding the involvement of Turks in the Chechen conflict, it would be erroneous to interpret this as proof that secular Turkey faces a serious Islamist problem. Turkish jihadis who have fought in Chechnya have found the Wahhabi Puritanism of their Arab jihadi comrades-in-arms unsettling, and many secular Turks partake in "jihad tours" simply to gain prestige at home in their tight knit families or neighborhoods. In addition, the vast majority of Turks interviewed tended to view Chechens as "terrorists" who reminded them of the hated Kurdish PKK/Kadek militants.

Finally, the involvement of two Turkish extremists (Azad Ekinci and Habib Akdas) who had a history of jihadi activity in Chechnya in the bloody al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 further undermined the Chechen cause in the country. [9] Indeed for all the romantic notions, some Turks have of volunteering to fight on behalf of the Chechens, the carnage wreaked on innocent Turks by El Kaide Turka (Turkish al-Qaeda) clearly demonstrates that jihadism has a potentially unpredictable effect on those who are attracted to it.

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/publication...cle_id=2369571

Turkey Succours Wounded Chechens

Dozens of Chechens here have been treated with the help of Turkish Islamist aid groups. Indeed, 150 new patients are expected to arrive at this hospital soon. In the wards, the patients - all young men - were nervous about being interviewed as they were concerned about the possibility of Russian reprisals against their relatives back home. Mohamed, a former student, lost his arm during a Russian air raid in Grozny. He would not say exactly how he had come to Istanbul. Real anger is palpable at a big pro-Chechen demonstration in Istanbul where protesters are expressing their frustration at what is happening to fellow Muslims in Chechnya. The Russians allege that financial and material aid to Chechnya is flowing through Turkey, although this is hard to prove. Pro-Islamist groups say their focus is on humanitarian assistance, but they say the government could and should do more. "No official policy can stand against the will of the people for long", says Bulent Yildirim of the National Youth Foundation. "Turkish public opinion is very sympathetic to the Chechens. So the current government will have to change its policy - or the people will change the government." Turks of Chechen origin are busy helping the few refugees who have made it to Turkey. Bouka Aidamirova escaped across the Chechen mountains and crossed into Georgia with her son, just before the Russians shut the route down. Bouka says she wants to go back - but only when the Russians have gone for good. For the moment however, she is stranded.

Turkey must be cautious

Politicians in Ankara may be sympathetic, but Russia is a huge neighbour, and Turkey's second largest trading partner. There are good reasons for treading carefully, according to Fehmi Koru, a political commentator, in a country with its own large minority group, the Kurds. "Turkey is very much dependent on Russian natural gas for example. And also there are people who feel that if Turkey tries to make a fuss about the Chechens, people will bring up the Kurds," Mr Koru says. At the moment, the Turkish government will not pour oil onto troubled waters. But if the war in Chechnya drags on, there may be pressure for a change of heart

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/628272.stm

Turkey And The Chechens

There is a substantial Chechen exile community in Turkey, which is particularly strong in Istanbul, and millions of Turks also trace their ancestry to the Caucasus. During the Russian military campaigns against Chechen rebels in the last few years, there have been persistent allegations from Russia that Turkish organisations have offered financial and material support to the independence movement. The Turkish and Russian governments recently signed an agreement for closer co-operation against militant groups, and the authorities in Ankara have always insisted that there is no official support for the rebel campaign. But Chechen fighters have been treated in Turkish hospitals, and the ruthlessness of the Russian military has generated considerable sympathy among ordinary Turks for their Chechen brethren. Turkey has also been dragged unwillingly into several previous hijackings involving the Chechen issue. The most famous occurred in 1996, when a group of pro-Chechen gunmen seized control of a passenger ferry off Turkey's northern Black Sea coast. More than 200 people were held hostage for several days by a gang, which included both Chechens and Turks. The hijackers were eventually imprisoned but all of them later escaped amid strong suspicions that they were allowed to go free.

THE CHECHEN DIASPORA IN TURKEY

The Chechen Diaspora is still taking shape. The devastating war in Chechnya that has lasted for ten years has already produced a large number of refugees. Most of them, of course, moved to Russia, while others chose to escape the old Empire and preferred to settle in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, trying to reach Western Europe from those countries. The second war in Chechnya has been going on for six years, leaving refugees without much hope of returning home anytime soon. They have started organizing themselves, trying to build the basis for a Diaspora, whose main task, like many other Diasporas around the world, is to support the resistance against the enemy. Turkey may be the best place for those seeking to continue the fight in Chechnya from abroad. During the first Chechen war (1994-1996), Turkish authorities played host to exiled Chechen warlords and allowed several Turkish mayors who were members of the Prosperity Party, an Islamic party, to provide medical aid and general support for the Chechen guerrillas. Within Turkish political society there even emerged a coalition between hardcore Islamists and nationalists who favored Turkish military intervention in Chechnya.

Thus, since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999, Turkey has represented a perfect safe haven for Chechen refugees, among them fighters who think that the war should be also supported from abroad and who look for international backing. Some 3,000 to 4,000 Chechens arrived in Turkey between 1999 and 2001. Since then, however, the number has declined. There are now probably only 1,500 Chechens left in the country. While some returned to Chechnya, the vast majority fled to Europe through Bulgaria or Ukraine. The situation for Chechen refugees in Turkey has changed. Political forces have largely given up the Chechen issue. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a factor in this, but not the only one. Today, religious associations, groups and individuals continue to support the Chechen cause as an act of giving Zakat (charity), one of the five pillars of Islam.

Turkish authorities, however, could not politically and openly take the "safe haven" position. Turkey had to increase its commercial and economic relations with Russia; Ankara is seeking to establish a privileged relationship with Moscow, particularly involving natural gas, and cannot allow the Chechen issue to weaken those efforts. Moreover, after September 11 and the start of the global war against terror, Turkish solidarity for Chechnya became difficult to sustain: the hosting of wounded Chechen fighters and arms transits (as was the case between 1994 and 1996, according to many observers and journalists) became hard to justify. Russia's information blockade of Chechnya also made it more difficult to aid the Chechens. It did not mean that the Turkish authorities did not know what was going on there, but it made it more difficult for them to make a convincing case that support from non-governmental associations or groups in Turkey would not be used for "terrorist" purposes.

However, it would be false to say that the moderate Islamist government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has totally renounced his country's historical and geopolitical alliance with local Caucasian forces against Russia. Turkey is simply playing a two-level game. On the one hand, Turkey proves to Russia its good intentions by putting pressure on the Chechen Diaspora. On the other, it keeps open opportunities for Chechen resistance groups to act from its territory – for example, by collecting and transferring funds to the Chechen guerrillas. Using this strategy, Turkey retains a powerful tool in its ongoing negotiations with Russia on commercial and economic matters. Through the Chechen Diaspora, Ankara is able to obtain concessions from Moscow. Thus the Turkish government is willing to sacrifice one part of the Chechen Diaspora and allow another part to prosper and act in the interests of the Chechen guerrillas. Erdogan's government needs the Chechens: it needs to keep them active, but not too active.

Two examples illustrate this approach. In February 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdulla Gül brought back from his visit to Moscow a list of 20 Chechens living in Turkey. Within months, several prominent Chechen rebels had either moved or relocated from their homes in Turkey. One of them, Zeindi Umarov, a former bodyguard of Aslan Maskhadov and a close collaborator of Umar Khanbiev, Maskhadov's general representative in Europe (including Turkey and South Caucasus), was resettled in Baku. At the same time, Alla Dudaeva, wife of the first Chechen president, Djokhar Dudaev, is still leaving peacefully in Istanbul; it seems that she is even protected by the Turkish authorities. More generally, some Chechen activists still find a welcoming shelter in Turkey. Zeindi Umarov was sacrificed so that others could stay.

Several days before the NATO summit in Turkey and the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in June 2004 and in December 2004, respectively, a dozen Chechen refugees from the refugee camps located on the outskirts of Istanbul were arrested by the Turkish special forces and charged with maintaining ties to Islamist groups, al-Qaeda in particular. (The arrests were confirmed by Chechen contacts in Istanbul and by Amnesty International, which provided the author of this article with a list of 12 names, all Chechens, arrested in June 2004.). All were released after the events and none of them had any effective links with international terrorist or Islamist networks. These arrests were only demonstrations of force by Turkish authorities, and probably also a kind of intimidation aimed at Chechens who might be tempted to go beyond the boundaries set by official structures in Turkey.

Playing the Chechen card as a negotiating tool assumes that all Chechen activities are under Turkish governmental control. Both of the above examples illustrate this two-level game. It could be dangerous if some Chechen groups were acting autonomously, outside the Turkish government's political strategy. Turkey lets some Chechens continue the war, but only under conditions imposed by the government in Ankara. That is why the Chechen Diaspora in Turkey is so tightly supervised. There is no political freedom for Chechen refugees, no chances for any Chechen political tendency to organize itself if the Turkish control structures do not allow it. The only political tendency that is unofficially accepted is the Maskhadov-related group. This has created a rift between the "Maskhadovites" and the "Dudaevists", who believe that Aslan Maskhadov, because of his moderation, has led Dudaev's legacy astray. This latter group cannot act freely. Rifts aside, the active part of the Chechen Diaspora in Turkey – including both fighters and emissaries collecting funds for them – continue to take advantage of their host's two-level game. And this, of course, does not go unnoticed by the Russians (see, for example "Turkish public organizations help Chechen separatists?", RIA Novosti, 5 November 2004).

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/publication...cle_id=2369276

Turkish building company denies funding Chechen militants

Turkish building company ENKA Wednesday rejected claims, made in a documentary program broadcast Tuesday on Russia's Channel One TV, that it had provided financing in the 1990s to Chechen militants. "We state that all information regarding our company broadcast April 22 in the Plan Caucasus TV program on Channel One is totally groundless and untrue," ENKA said. "We deny all such accusations." ENKA is one of Turkey's largest construction companies working in Russia. The claims were made against ENKA in the TV program by Sultan Kekhursayev, now living in Istanbul. He said he had been "[now dead Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar] Dudayev's army brigadier general." Kekhursayev said large Turkish companies working in Russia, including ENKA, funded the seizure of Chechnya's capital Grozny in the summer 1996, adding that they "had done much" to assist militants. Sporadic terrorist attacks and militant clashes are common in Chechnya, although the active phase of the Kremlin campaign to fight separatists and terrorists is over. Violence often spills over into neighboring North Caucasus republics, including Ingushetia and Daghestan.

Source: http://en.rian.ru/world/20080423/105751390.html