This spring, in connection with the past and upcoming anniversaries of the events of the Russian spring and the Liberation War of the Russian people in the Donbass, many memories come out in the form of interviews and various kinds of memoirs, someone recalls, someone sticks out his role, and who fulfills the order I myself decided not to philosophize, but would ask to answer a series of questions to the First Minister of Defense of the DPR and the creator of the VSN, Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, who kindly agreed to answer them. The volume came out clearly not for the blog, and therefore I divide it into two parts - the Slavic and Donetsk. Actually the interview itself:
1. Igor Ivanovich, the very first question is of course the beginning of the events in Donetsk, what did you expect? Was there hope for the Crimean scenario? You are now accused of provocative work, work on the Security Service of Ukraine, alarmism and other nonsense, while critics come from the promise that there was no hope and the Russian authorities did not plan anything, but did they really have any reason to believe?
Naturally, I had reason to rely on the “Crimean scenario” for the Donbass and even more broadly - to create Novorossia. The probability of direct support from the Russian Federation at that time was very high. Let me remind you that at that time a large military grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was concentrated on the borders of Ukraine, there was plenty of evidence that the military were already putting on the military equipment the emblem "MS" - "Peacekeeping Forces". But this is all well known, and I had "closed" information. At the moment, I believe that it still represents a state secret. Therefore, I can not share it and I can (if I can) not soon. Anyway, I was sure that the main task was to ensure the holding of the referendum, and after it, the Russian Federation will somehow provide direct and effective support to the popular uprising. “Play back” from the Kremlin began approximately from April 26 (remember, we entered Slavyansk on April 12, that is, 2 weeks have passed since the beginning of the armed confrontation). As far as I know: on these days a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was held, at which it was decided to postpone the deployment of Russian troops to Ukraine.
And on May 7, after the visit of Burkhalter’s “procurator”, Moscow completely canceled plans to overthrow the Kiev junta. I understood this by a call that SV Aksenov made for me from the Crimea on those very days (May 7–9, I don’t remember exactly) - he directly suggested that I immediately return to Crimea, “where everything will be fine with me”. To my question - "where to put hundreds of militiamen" he did not intelligibly answer, what is my communication with him interrupted until the fall. Naturally, I didn’t even think to give up people who believed me or tell someone about such a proposal (this could undermine the morale of the newly formed militia, which was on an unprecedented rise). From now on, I "carried in myself" an understanding that we, the Russian militias of Donbass and volunteers, were cynically betrayed. But there was hope that if we manage to hold out for a long time, the situation will change and support from the Russian Federation will still be rendered. This happened later, but it took three and a half months to “keep” not days or weeks. And all this time I had to “carry a heavy stone in my soul” - after all, almost until the middle of August, hopes for help were scanty and unreliable, and no one could remove the burden of responsibility for the thousands of fighters and the protection of the densely populated region. By the end of my stay in the Donbas, I was dead tired - first and foremost morally. This explains some of my mistakes in the last period of command. However, they accuse me of cowardice and anxiety in vain - I was not a fear for my life, but an awareness of the enormous responsibility and the understanding that it was impossible for me to die - the defense simply collapsed (this was especially at the last stage of Slavyansk defense and until the end of July, when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. By the end of my stay in the Donbas, I was dead tired - first and foremost morally. This explains some of my mistakes in the last period of command. However, they accuse me of cowardice and anxiety in vain - I was not a fear for my life, but an awareness of the enormous responsibility and the understanding that it was impossible for me to die - the defense simply collapsed (this was especially at the last stage of Slavyansk defense and until the end of July, when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. By the end of my stay in the Donbas, I was dead tired - first and foremost morally. This explains some of my mistakes in the last period of command. However, they accuse me of cowardice and anxiety in vain - I was not a fear for my life, but an awareness of the enormous responsibility and the understanding that it was impossible for me to die - the defense simply collapsed (this was especially at the last stage of Slavyansk defense and until the end of July, when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. However, they accuse me of cowardice and anxiety in vain - I was not a fear for my life, but an awareness of the enormous responsibility and the understanding that it was impossible for me to die - the defense simply collapsed (this was especially at the last stage of Slavyansk defense and until the end of July, when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. However, they accuse me of cowardice and anxiety in vain - I was not a fear for my life, but an awareness of the enormous responsibility and the understanding that it was impossible for me to die - the defense simply collapsed (this was especially at the last stage of Slavyansk defense and until the end of July, when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes. when hopes for Moscow’s help began to grow gradually). And, as critically, I myself did not refer to my “military talents”, I suppose, nevertheless, that I took at all stages much more correct and timely decisions than I made mistakes.
2. In the semi-official circles of the DPR, it is fashionable to say that you criticized the people of Donetsk from day one and declared their unwillingness to stand up and defend their homeland, all this is very far from the truth, but how did the population of Slavyansk meet you? How many were willing to join the ranks?
At different points in the development of the militia, the situation with the volunteers from the local population developed differently. At the very beginning, we lacked even the simplest small arms, as well as ammunition. And so, for example, in Slavyansk until the very end, people who were not ready to perform tasks "anywhere and at any time" were not enrolled in the subunits, but were ready to serve near the place of residence. They were put in squads and connected to law enforcement and the maintenance of the curfew in Slavyansk, but there was nothing to arm them with, so they carried out their voluntary service with hunting rifles, etc., to the very end. "improvised means". At a certain point, there were more such people than those who decided to join the militia "on a common basis". It is to them that I, first of all, addressed his calls. Naturally, if we had at least some opportunity to dress people and provide them with the minimum monetary allowance, there would be much more volunteers. But we did not have this. Our relative lack of organization stopped many of them - there was a catastrophic lack of junior commanders and even more - commanders of middle managers ... There was an acute shortage of transport. Yes, everything was not enough, people saw it and many had natural fears for their future and the future of families. As we can see now, these fears were not at all groundless ... unfortunately ... Our relative lack of organization stopped many of them - there was a catastrophic lack of junior commanders and even more - commanders of middle managers ... There was an acute shortage of transport. Yes, everything was not enough, people saw it and many had natural fears for their future and the future of families. As we can see now, these fears were not at all groundless ... unfortunately ... Our relative lack of organization stopped many of them - there was a catastrophic lack of junior commanders and even more - commanders of middle managers ... There was an acute shortage of transport. Yes, everything was not enough, people saw it and many had natural fears for their future and the future of families. As we can see now, these fears were not at all groundless ... unfortunately ...
To wait when the Pitmen independently “mature” and “swing” to join the militia with the direct goal of fighting (and the war unfolded rapidly - especially after the Kremlin recognized Poroshenko’s legitimacy - from that moment the APU began to carry out its orders and more actively attack us) - I could not. It was necessary by whatever means to get at the disposal of as many people as possible ready to fight. Therefore, I was not particularly shy in expressions and I do not doubt the correctness of my actions today.
As for the support of the population, we had it all the time. Up to the very last moment. People free and voluntarily fed us, helped as much as they could. Themselves revealed saboteurs "right sector" (they were) and detained them. Even when serious shelling began, the overwhelming majority of residents still supported us, considered and called defenders. It was universal support that helped maintain high morale among the militias — if not, by any repressive methods — I could not maintain order and discipline in the still completely raw guerilla formations.
3. How long could Slavyansk stand without breaking the blockade from the outside? Is there any hope of waiting for vacationers? Have you ever been informed about future plans?
Difficult to determine exactly. It all depended on how intensely the enemy would be ready to attack us in urban areas. But I can definitely say that we would quickly be driven into the depths of the city finally, since we practically had no ammunition for heavy weapons (not to mention the fact that this weapon was very small compared to its presence in the enemy). For 2 serviceable tanks, we had one and a half bombs (about 40 shells), 9 mortars - a little more than fifty minutes. On 2 serviceable "Nona" - 40 shells. Practically there were no shots to the ATGM, and those that were there were unreliable (they worked "two after the third"). The same problem was with RPG shots and disposable grenade launchers. Almost completely absent anti-tank and there were no anti-personnel mines. The enemy had over 40 guns and even more mortars, at least a hundred tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry combat vehicles, apart from armored personnel carriers and other light armored vehicles (we had 2 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles and 2 trophy BMDs together with the Kramatorsk garrison). Enemy heavy artillery shot the city and our positions from a distance completely inaccessible to our weapons. Perhaps the enemy would not generally storm the city until mid-July - gradually squeezing the ring and shooting city buildings with impunity. At the time of release, the enemy actively strengthened around the perimeter, put mines and wire barriers. I believe that we could “sit out” without the slightest sense even the fall of Donetsk (I think it would almost certainly have fallen by mid-July). In any case, even assuming that the "vacationers" with such a development of the situation we would have entered the same time frame - until mid-August we would not have lasted in Slavyansk. We even would have enough ammunition for small arms, for a maximum, for a couple of weeks (this is without an assault, and for a maximum of 3-4 days).
Nobody informed me of any plans.
4. Did the garrison commanders of other cities submit to you? How did you coordinate with you, as Minister of Defense of the Republic, your actions?
It is necessary to understand that “the Minister of Defense” was a formal title. There was neither a ministry, nor even a joint headquarters through which I could lead troops outside Slavyansk. I could not create such a headquarters from the few available officers and with the almost complete absence of a closed communication. And I doubt if anyone else could. In fact, before the exit from Slavyansk, I managed to lead only those garrisons that were directly formed "from Slavyansk" and were locked into my support line. These are: Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Semyonovka, Nikolaevka (before the betrayal of “Filin” and “Minera”), Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka and Seversk (before defeat near Yampol). I also voluntarily coordinated my actions with Brainstorming, later in the Donetsk period - for some time he passed into my direct obedience (until the moment when with the fall of Debaltseve we were cut off from each other). The small garrison was in Popasna, a small detachment submitted to me in Dokuchaevsk (formally). Later, when I was able to establish contact with them, "Batman" and "205th" (Izvarino garrison) in the LC, I obeyed.
I could not leave Slavyansk without risking the surrender of the city to the enemy - there was no person who would have authority equal to mine (and in the partisan formation, in fact, the authority of the leader is extremely important - this is not a regular army). An attempt to appoint a deputy and go to Donetsk in early June ended with a meeting convened on this occasion - I realized that even the possibility of my departure had stupor all company commanders and other comrades.
Moreover, to be honest, I myself did not rush to Donetsk - too much information came about endless squabbles there among the “people's leaders” and local “commanders”.
I realized that when I went to Donetsk, I would have to shift the command of the subunits to other people (since I myself had to deal mainly with a lot of other "near-war" issues) and I did not watch the "ready-made" among my colleagues at that time.
When the exit did take place, I decided to move the group of the former garrisons of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka and Konstantinovka concentrated in Enakievo directly to Donetsk (since I came to the city and made sure that he was not ready for defense "from the word in general" ) - there is a dilemma: to take the "established" seven command "for granted" and try to urgently organize the defense of the city and the rest of the territory of the republic with our own and joining forces - or "direct unity of command", having lost several days to this process c, the need for which was absolutely not obvious to the masses.
I chose the first - trying as quickly as possible (since in a completely peaceful city, natural decomposition of the units that had escaped from the trenches and the encirclement) began and directed them to form a defensive ring around the city.
Thus, the line "Petrovsky District-Ilovaisk-Snezhnoye" was formed - solely at the expense of the Slavic Brigade + the weak Kerch battalion included in it. In the city itself, the Kalmius battalion, some (lesser) number of people from the Russian Orthodox Army (RPA) and small independent groups and divisions, came under my complete submission.
Later, all the remaining forces had to be thrown on the defense of Shakhtersk, then - up to the company of the military police, reconnaissance and commandant company - to throw forces on Stepanovka-Marinovka, direction to Krasny Luch-Miusinsk, and to cover communications from the north to Gorlovka in Zhdanovka region. By the time when the enemy slammed the encirclement around Donetsk on August 6, I had no units except my guards in the building of the Donetsk department of the Security Service of Ukraine except for my guards, and 60 unarmed people (there was nothing to arm) volunteers. In total, together with the headquarters, there were 2-3 dozens of people armed with small arms.
Now about submission. "Cossacks" almost all refused to obey categorically. They did not participate in the defense of Donetsk. "Kozitsinsky" consistently threw positions at the approach of the enemy. From the Red Estuary (from where they fled without a fight, leaving the local militia, which the battle just gave) - through Popasna (fled without a single shot), through Debaltseve (fled when the enemy approached the city 10 kilometers) and to Red Ray ( The "Kozitsinsky Cossack" garrison escaped, and when the city was occupied by two companies of the "Slavs" - returned, but refused to withdraw to the position).
Voluntarily transferred to operational submission "Oplot" Zakharchenko. At the same time, I didn’t have real power over Zakharchenko himself or his army, since they were "another department" - Zakharchenko was considered "the commander of the internal troops". Therefore, all joint actions had to be coordinated.
The combat capability of his forces was low, but since he had as many as 5 tanks (the crews of four of which, however, diligently declined to participate in the battles for any reason other than one - valiantly killed in the battle of Marinovka), and scatter at least one armed man did not have to - "thank you for it." They provided some kind of help in Shakhtersk and under Dmitrovka - although they would have distracted the enemy’s attention and caused some losses.
Khodakovsky, right up to my very departure, categorically refused not to obey, but even to establish any coordination at all (which I repeatedly sent him requests through anyone, up to and including Beard). His garrison somehow covered Yasinovataya (which the enemy, however, never attacked in front of me). I believe that if I had attacked, then they would have handed over it exactly as well without a fight, like Avdiivka. However, thanks to his fighters for the fact that they didn’t pass the train station and even captured the tank when ukry with a small armored group approached him.
Worse, Hodakovsky was constantly trying to campaign among our fighters. For example, in the midst of fighting for Shakhtersk, he “lured” to him a whole mortar platoon from the former Konstantinovsky garrison, lied that we were “throwing” Donetsk (while the platoon was aimed at strengthening the group that led the fighting for Shakhtersk - our only communication with “big land”, without which the city would quickly fall). As a result, this platoon did not participate in any battle, until mid-August.
The fighters of the Vostok took some part in the defense of Karlovka (for the surrender of which I was regularly "watered", although at the same time the Slavs could not fight at the same time, and that did not prevent me from sending a company there,
Karlovka could not be held by the available forces. And I was completely unprepared to “change” Karlovka to Shakhtersk.
The situation was more difficult with Bezler. He first submitted to me and regularly came to Slavyansk for help. And got it. Right up to the moment when I sent him a group of "Ataman" of 40 fighters so that he could fully control Gorlovka. Immediately after that, he established his own supply chain, and forgot to think about submission. On the contrary, he practiced “enticing” people and divisions not only in the case of Nikolayevka (when, at the most serious moment, the Minera company that had never been in a battle threw down its position and fled to Gorlovka, baring the front). He made the same attempts in Konstantinovka, for example.
After leaving Slavyansk, I arrived at his headquarters with minimal security and tried to smooth out misunderstandings, judging that "a thin world is better than a good quarrel, but someone needs to defend Gorlovka." If necessary, he had to coordinate with me some of his actions during the defense of Donetsk (before his departure at the end of July). Several times we threw various weapons and ammunition to each other. Actually, he did not obey me. After his departure, coordination with the "Boatswain" remaining for the commandant (and then the "Major" who replaced him) improved significantly. (Although my order to abandon Gorlovka and move to the defense in the Shakhtersk area, the Boatsman did not comply, for which I thanked him a few days later. However, I’m pretty sure
5. Fashion trend in propaganda - Putin asked to postpone the referendum, the Donetsk residents did not listen to him, for which they suffered. Judging by my impressions from Donetsk, the one who would try to transfer him would simply be torn. Was this question seriously considered at all? Was there any official appeal from the authorities of the Russian Federation?
Claims of this kind are a blatant, blatant, hypocritical lie. Called to justify the betrayal of Russian Novorossia, who relied on the Kremlin and Putin personally. As for the technical side of the negotiations between Moscow and Donetsk on the referendum, I know about them only by hearsay, since I did not even deal with the organization of the referendum in Slavyansk, focusing on military and military organizational matters. I did not have enough time for them.
6. In one of the interviews you mentioned that there were no forces in the former political elite of Donbass ready to support the uprising, can you explain in more detail - didn’t these forces exist at all, or did they require any guarantees?
I write about my impressions and conclusions (in which, however, I am fairly sure), the “political part”, as already noted above, was not engaged. He believed that for this there is the leadership of the Republic.
But some negotiations with local politicians, managers and business owners, of course, had to be conducted. Overall impression - they waited. If the authorities of the Russian Federation clearly and in time indicated their position, the transition of the “elite” to our side would be swift and massive. But “Moscow was at first cautious, and then in general“ went back down. ”Sincere Russian patriots among the representatives of business structures, politicians and local“ authorities ”like Chaloy and Aksenov in the Crimea - in Donetsk and Lugansk, alas, were not ... I love to say "from the word in general."
Unfortunately, I have serious resources of our own in order to incline them to our side. there was not. To force them with an armed force would be a dubious event, since they would simply flee away (by closing enterprises and offices) and then they would definitely be in the ranks of our enemies.
7. Many times asked a question about the surrender of Donetsk and the retreat to Snow, alas, it pops up every time, were there such plans? And if what were the motivation?
I have already partially answered above. I will add the following:
In fact, only the wrong assessment of the general position by the enemy and his lack of energy in actions saved us from a complete rout in the middle - second half of July. In place of the enemy command (even with the relatively low morale of their troops), I (surely) managed to completely block Donetsk long before the notorious “northern wind”. The enemy made the main mistake in the operation in the Shakhtersk-Snezhnoe-Saur-Grave area by climbing with insufficient forces (although in technology they were noticeably superior to everything we had in the area) directly to the city.
It was enough for them to simply “straddle” the road in any flat, unplanned place, or in the section Torez-Shakhtersk, or Shakhtersk-Snezhnoe and dig in. And that’s all - we couldn’t have done anything with the BTG “25-ki” forces. We did not have to take frontal attacks, and we still desperately lacked real artillery (and, most importantly, ammunition).
I managed to predict their maneuver on the city. Immediately after receiving reports of the fall of Debaltseve, I urgently removed from other sites and sent to Shakhtersk (in which even three dozen soldiers did not have at that time, there was only a poorly armed checkpoint at the exit to Snezhniy) three companies - one from Petrovsky District Donetsk, one of Ilovaisk, one - from the area of Snow (from the composition of the assault battalion "Torah"). By the time Ukrov arrived in Shakhtersk, one company was already there and did not allow them to fully control the city. And the other two were already in motion and arrived very soon. As soon as he received news of the beginning of the battles, he immediately sent two more companies, all the available equipment and artillery + everything that the Oplot could send (Zakharchenko — I must give him his due — he also left there). However
I overestimated the forces of the enemy (waking me in their place - I would have sent everything that could and could not be sent to Shakhtersk). And I decided that he had engaged there no less than a reinforced battalion (in reality, there was a reinforcement battalion - just very poorly manned and not enough - equipment).
Based on this idea, I decided that on the spot of the enemy I would not confine myself to a strike from the north against Shakhtersk alone - but I would send another 2-3 strike groups to Zugres and Thorez (not even covered by checkpoints from the north). Therefore, having sent all that was possible from untapped sites to Shakhtersk (and as a result, having achieved a serious - triple approximately - numerical advantage, which allowed us to win the most important victory for us), at the same time began to look for - to cover the Donetsk-Shakhtersk-Snezhnoye highway with north on other sites. I had no strength left in Donetsk. Therefore, I - realizing that if Shakhtersk falls, Donetsk and Gorlovka will be doomed, I decided to "sacrifice" Gorlovka for the salvation of Donetsk, throwing the garrison to cover the routes of communication.
I repeat once again - if the enemy acted somewhat adequately from a military point of view - failure by the Boatsman (Bezler was no longer in the city - he was “behind the tape” until mid-August) would have led to the encirclement and the subsequent rout of both garrisons . But the enemy made a serious mistake, much "overlapping" my own.
And the "Boatswain", not submitting to me (based purely on their "Gorlovsky" considerations) - turned out to be right. Meanwhile, believing that the enemy is trying to “slam the trap” behind Donetsk (which will make further resistance almost impossible - without cartridges, it’s impossible to fight nowadays), I really raised the question of moving the command post closer to the epicenter of the fighting - to Snow (by the way, further battles proved that it was the environs of this city that became the main point of the enemy’s efforts for the end of July-beginning of August) The headquarters was partially collapsed, I went with him to Shakhtersk (the deployment option was being considered and right there). NS (E.Hasanov) and some of the employees with a liaison were left in Donetsk until they received additional instructions, as the transfer of the entire headquarters was not resolved. After reviewing the situation on the spot and making sure that the enemy behaves passively and there is a good chance to knock him out of the city - I decided not to interfere in the battle leadership (which the commanders of various companies and divisions under the general - as is clear now - purely nominal - leadership Kononov ("Tsar"). Just because, in fact, he was in a state of serious nervous and physical exhaustion (sleeping for 3-4 hours every day for three months is not conducive to health) and was not sure that I could manage with sufficient energy I fought over the possibility of leaving Donetsk? Yes, I thought. I also shared these thoughts (strictly alone) with two or three people, whom I thought could trust them, including, unfortunately, with Beard. But evidence of "panic" such reflections were not at all - only an honest analysis of the situation in mid-July. The correlation of forces with the punishers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was already "very heavy" for us and with each week it became more and more depressing. The growth in the number and armament of the militia could in no way compensate for the build-up of forces from the enemy. The front was a rare chain of posts with "gaps", sometimes tens of kilometers. With proper use of the situation (the enemy, thank God, continued to make mistake after mistake), we could in a few days “break as a hot-water bottle”. And, sooner or later, without the "northern wind" it would have happened (preparing a "parade of victory" for the "day of Ukraine" on August 24 in Kiev, Poroshenko proceeded from quite objective prerequisites for the development of events).
In such a situation, I, as the commander of thousands of people, had to think about their future (after a probable defeat) fate. At the same time, he himself was well aware that “for me there is no land behind a ribbon” and my own future seemed to me in the most gloomy light. I really (especially theoretically) thought about the possibility - in case of complete defeat (and it was frankly brewing) - evacuation of all the surviving forces somewhere in the area closer to the border, so that later they could take refuge in the territory of the Russian Federation.
No specific plans and instructions on this score have been developed. At the same time, during the fighting for Shakhtersk, I completely refused to have such thoughts - appreciating the scale of possible evacuation and recalling the much smaller evacuation from Slavyansk, I decided that with our poverty and lack of organization, any attempt to divert parts would turn into an indiscriminate flight, terrible chaos and a complete rout even without the direct impact of the enemy. Therefore, it remained only to accept the battle in occupied positions and fight to the end, and there - as God wills.
In the evening, having taken some organizational measures, I returned to Donetsk with an understanding of the real situation. More until the very end, the question was not raised about leaving any settlements (without a fight), or about moving the headquarters.
As for my "cowardice", I can give a small example. Early in the morning of August 6, I went to a meeting in Krasnodon (this was one of three cases when I went there in July and August). In the morning we rode freely through the city - on its outskirts I even met a small convoy, which was sent to us for reinforcement and which we had been waiting for a long time - it was the last in my time.
But on the way back, the road between Red Ray and Snow was already cut by the enemy. It was impossible to drive directly along the road. Understanding that my absence in a surrounded city would have a very negative effect on the morale of the surrounded units and disorganize even the weak control that was established - I ordered to drive around the intercepted area along the roads. For several hours, we had a hard time looking for a detour, several times we were pushing our heavy "collector" Gazelle, stuck in the mud, but by nightfall, we slipped into Snezhnoe and at night to Donetsk. I do not think that an inveterate coward would have sought to return to the environment, with rather elusive chances to get out of it later.
At the meeting in the narrow circle of headquarters, he announced on his return that we would now be in Donetsk until the very end, before the street fighting at the headquarters inclusive.
8. A bit about your resignation - like you mentioned guarantees and promises to your subordinates. More?
It is impossible, unfortunately. There are people who may suffer from my honest and detailed answers. Therefore, let it be better for me to continue to be watered with all sorts of verbal and written crap than I, justifying myself (it was, before whom), would “substitute” my comrades.
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